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Abstract
The implosion of the 2008 financial crisis ignited fears that integration would
transmit the crisis’ effects throughout the global system. Examining two countries,
Bangladesh and Zambia, this project shows that low-income countries with relatively
little integration also saw negative impacts. This occurred through three main
transmission mechanisms: trade flows, rising prices and financial flows that could have
possible long-term effects at the macro and micro level. The manner and impact of each
transmission mechanism, however, varied among LICs according to each country’s
individual structural economic and financial vulnerabilities. Bangladesh saw a delayed
impact but did not avoid the crisis completely, while Zambia saw a quick impact but
recovered sooner. Where their individual cases converge, they offer recommendations for
other LICs embarking on trade and financial liberalization in an interconnected but risky
system.

ii

Acknowledgements

To Dad

iii

Table of Contents
CHAPTER ONE: A TRANSMISSION FRAMEWORK .................................................. 1
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1
A Framework: Macroeconomic Transmission Mechanisms to LICs ..................... 4
Trade Mechanism........................................................................................ 4
Rising Food and Fuel Prices ....................................................................... 7
Financial Mechanism .................................................................................. 9
A Framework: Transmission Linked to Structural Vulnerability ......................... 13
Selection of Zambia and Bangladesh .................................................................... 19
CHAPTER TWO: BANGLADESH CASE STUDY ....................................................... 21
Delayed Impact but Slow Recovery ..................................................................... 21
The Great Recession and its Trade Transmission (2008-2010) ............................ 22
Trade Transmission Linked to Structural Vulnerability ....................................... 29
First Period (1971-1985) ........................................................................... 29
Second Period (1985-2008) ...................................................................... 33
The Great Recession and its Financial Transmission (2008-2010) ...................... 38
Financial Transmission Linked to Structural Vulnerability.................................. 42
Moving Forward (2011 and Beyond) ................................................................... 44
Export Concentration and Associated Vulnerable Trade Characteristics . 44
Shallow Financial System ......................................................................... 48
Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 51
CHAPTER THREE: Zambia CASE STUDY................................................................... 54
Quick Impact but Stronger Recovery ................................................................... 54
The Great Recession and its Trade Transmission (2008-2010) ............................ 55
Transmission Linked to Structural Vulnerability (1964-2008) ............................ 62
First Period (1964-1991) ........................................................................... 62
Second Period (1991-2008) ...................................................................... 66
The Great Recession and the Financial Transmission (2008-2010) ..................... 68
Financial Transmission Linked to Structural Vulnerability.................................. 72
Moving Forward (2011 and Beyond) ................................................................... 76
Export Concentration and Associated Vulnerable Trade Characteristics . 76
Shallow Financial System ......................................................................... 79
Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 81
CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARISONS, CONCLUSIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS ... 84
The Trade Transmission: Conclusions and General Recommendations .............. 84
Considerations for Other LICs .................................................................. 86
The Financial Transmission: Conclusions and General Recommendations ......... 89
Considerations for other LICs ................................................................... 91
Conclusions and Future Questions........................................................................ 93
Appendix A ..................................................................................................................... 105
iv

Table of Figures
Figure 1: GDP Growth Globally and by Income Group, as a percentage (2006-2011) ..... 5
Figure 2: Global Growth of Volume of Exports of Goods and Services, as a percentage
(2006-2011)......................................................................................................................... 6
Figure 3: Bangladesh GDP growth, constant prices as a percentage (1995-2011) ........... 23
Figure 4: Bangladesh Growth of Volume of Exports and Imports, as a percentage (20062012) ................................................................................................................................. 23
Figure 5: Bangladesh’s Quarterly Export Growth, as a percentage (July 2008-Sept. 2009)
........................................................................................................................................... 25
Figure 6: Bangladesh’s Quarterly Import Growth, as a percentage (July 2008-Sept. 2009)
........................................................................................................................................... 27
Figure 7: GoB Revenues, Expenditures and Borrowing/Lending, as a percentage of GDP
(2000-2012)....................................................................................................................... 28
Figure 8: Bangladesh’s Current Account Balance, in US Billions (2006-2012) .............. 29
Figure 9: Bangladesh’s Net Barter Terms of Trade, 2000=100 (1980-2009) .................. 32
Figure 10: Bangladesh’s Interest Rate (2006-2010) ......................................................... 40
Figure 11: FDI Inflows to Bangladesh, in US Millions (1990-2009) ............................... 41
Figure 12: Zambia’s GDP, in constant national prices, US billions (1995-2011) ............ 55
Figure 13: Zambia GDP Growth, in constant prices as a percentage (1995-2011) .......... 55
Figure 14: Copper Price, in USD per metric ton (Jan. 2008-Nov. 2009) ......................... 57
Figure 15: Crude Oil Price, in USD per barrel (Jan. 2008-Nov. 2009) ............................ 57
Figure 16: Zambian Exports and Imports, in US Millions (Jan. 2008-Nov. 2009) .......... 58
Figure 17: Zambia's Balance of Payments, in US Billions (2006-2011) .......................... 58
Figure 18: Zambian Government Revenues and Spending, as a percentage of GDP (20002010) ................................................................................................................................. 61

v

Figure 19: Zambian Government Net lending/borrowing, as a percentage of GDP (20002010) ................................................................................................................................. 61
Figure 20: Zambia's Net Barter Terms of Trade, 2000=100 (1980-2009)........................ 66
Figure 21: Zambia's Interest Rate (2007-2009) ................................................................ 69
Figure 22: FDI Inflows to Zambia, US Millions (1990-2009) ......................................... 71

vi

List of Acronyms
ADB
ADP
AfDB
ATC
BB
BGMEA
BMTC
BoP
BoZ
DFI
EU
FAO
FCB
FDI
FSDP
GDP
GoB
HIC
HIPC
IMF
LIC
LuSE
MDG
MFA
MFI
MIC
NPL
NRF
ODA
OECD
PCB
RMG
ROA
ROE
RoZ
SAP
SOE
SCB
WFP
ZCCM
WB

Asian Development Bank
Annual Development Programs
African Development Bank
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Bangladesh Bank
Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Export Association
Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation
Balance of Payments
Bank of Zambia
Development Finance Institution
European Union
Food and Agriculture Organization
Foreign Commercial Bank
Foreign Direct Investment
Financial Sector Development Plan
Gross Domestic Product
Government of Bangladesh
High-Income Country
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
International Monetary Fund
Low-Income Country
Lusaka Stock Exchange
Millennium Development Goal
Multi-Fiber Agreement
Microfinance Institution
Middle-Income Country
Non Performing Loan
Natural Resource Fund
Official Development Assistance
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
Private Commercial Bank
Ready-Made Garment
Return on Assets
Return on Equity
Republic of Zambia
Structural Adjustment Program
State-owned Enterprise
State-Owned Commercial Bank
World Food Program
Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines
World Bank

vii

CHAPTER ONE: A TRANSMISSION FRAMEWORK
Introduction
The implosion of the 2008 financial crisis ignited fears that international trade and
financial integration would transmit the crisis’ effects throughout the global system.
How and to what extent continues to unfold. Coined as “The Great Recession”, the
breadth and depth of this crisis has been said to surpass any previous economic or
financial crisis endured by the global system. Almost all countries suffered because of
decreased economic growth but in varying depth and magnitude individually. For
developed countries, financial integration became the primary transmission channel.
Many of these countries were overleveraged with complex, high-risk financial products
to the private sector and as a result, saw the largest declines in growth1.
In contrast, the Great Recession had far less impact on low-income countries
(LICs)2 than middle-income (MICs) or high-income countries (HICs) given their limited
trade and financial integration. Nevertheless, international institutions3 raised red flags to
the possible effects on LICs due to their structural political, economic and social
constraints, including high poverty levels that impeded recovery options. While
1

Pelen Berkmen, et al, The Global Financial Crisis: Explaining Cross‐Country Differences in the Output Impact. The International
Monetary Fund, Working Paper, WP/09/280 (2009): 14‐15.

2

This project uses the following World Bank classifications from April 2011: low‐income: $995 GNI per capita or less, lower‐middle
income, $996 ‐ $3,965; upper‐middle income, $3,966 ‐ $12,265; and high income, $12,266 or more. These were adjusted upward in
later 2011 by $10 for each category using its Atlas methodology. For the purposes of this project and all data computation, the April
2011 country groupings have been maintained.

3

These institutions were mainly the IMF, United Nations and World Bank but also regional development institutions including the
AfDB and ADB.

1

uninvolved with subprime mortgages or risky derivatives, they argued that the world’s
poorest citizens would be especially vulnerable to the trade and financial transmission of
the crisis along with rising food and fuel prices4. As a result of this triple combination,
the World Bank (2010) estimated that 41 million more people would go undernourished
in 2009, and 64 million more people would live under the $1.25 a day poverty line by
20105. Moreover, it warned of the long-term consequences on development initiatives
like the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
The World Bank (2009) conducted a study in early 2009 of 107 middle and lowincome developing countries to predict the level of vulnerability among countries and the
possible development implications. They examined two main factors for each country:
first, a demonstration of declining GDP growth6 and second, an initial high level of
poverty7. Those countries that exhibited both characteristics were said to be highly
exposed. The results identified 43 countries in this category. Of those 43 countries, 23
countries were LICs by definition, including both case study countries of this project,
Bangladesh and Zambia.
This work argued that the world’s poorest nations would be susceptible despite
lower integration. However, it largely focused on how economic decisions and
consequences in advanced countries would reach vulnerable countries as an entire group.
This drew attention to the implications of the crisis in developed countries versus

4

Given this triple combination, it would be difficult to disaggregate the effects of the crisis alone.

5

Sailesh Tiwari and Hassan Zaman, The Impact of Economic Shocks on Global Undernourishment. Policy Research Working Paper
#5215, The World Bank, World Bank (2010): 2‐3.

6

Defined as real per capita economic growth expected to be lower in 2008–09 compared to the studied period of 2004–2007.

7

Defined by the country having had 20 percent or more of households below the $1.25 poverty line in 2005.

2

developing countries. It neither delved within or between low- and middle-income groups
nor examined how unique economic and financial conditions could differentiate the depth
and magnitude of the effects among LICs. This was not done purposefully, but primarily
because of a lack of and/or lagged data from these countries that prevented quality
analysis at that time8. Additionally, LICs do share common characteristics that explain
how they might collectively suffer the crisis.
Nevertheless, the variances among LICs are important because they serve as
reminders that poor countries do not have homogenous economic histories or policies. As
a result, neither are their options for coping with or recovery from global macroeconomic
shocks. With this in mind, this project examines how and why the Great Recession
affected LICs, both similarly and differently. It begins by summarizing the three
transmission mechanisms to LICs: trade flows, rising prices, and financial flows. Using
development theory, it then reviews the interrelated structural vulnerabilities of many
LICs that helped determine the severity of the transmission, including narrow exports that
are low-cost and use little technology, and shallow financial systems.
Chapters Two and Three use this framework to compare two cases: Bangladesh
and Zambia9. Each case study analyzes the impacts of the transmission mechanisms and
connects them to the country’s economic and financial structural vulnerabilities. It
concludes with individual policy recommendations to address these weaknesses. These
recommendations are not unknown but reemphasize the importance and challenge to
overcome them. While some are country-specific, others are noteworthy for other LICs
8

This constraint remains today and is a general problem of research in LICs.

9

Using the April 2011 World Bank categorization, both were LICs: Zambia at $970 GNI per capita and Bangladesh at $580 GNI per
capita.
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pursuing trade and financial liberalization, and these are summarized in Chapter Four
with overall project conclusions.
A Framework: Macroeconomic Transmission Mechanisms to LICs
Beginning in late 200710, the subprime mortgage crisis caused firms and
households to deleverage. This spread to financial markets worldwide, causing a rapid
liquidation of assets, a decline in prices and a reduction in aggregate demand. The
transmission to LICs then occurred through a decline in trade and financial flows and an
increase in food and fuel prices. Trade flows refer to exports and imports. Financial flows
include financial intermediation and public and private international capital including
trade finance, foreign direct investment (FDI), official development assistance (ODA),
and remittances. Domestic labor, financial and product markets then channeled these
macroeconomic shocks to the household level, but this project does not deeply explore
these impacts.
Trade Mechanism
First, the financial crisis was channeled to LICs through the trade mechanism, or
the international flow of goods and services. As a result of a decline in aggregate
demand, world trade fell by 11 percent in 2009 from 200811. This led to subsequent falls
in production, employment, household income, purchasing power and government
revenues. World GDP contracted .57 percent from 2008 to 2009 and fell on average 5.9
percent among all countries from 2007 to 200912. The effects were worse in high and

10

For the purposes of this project, the end of this crisis period is marked at the end 2010, when world trade and GDP growth again
registered positive gains.

11

International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database (April 2010).

12

Ibid.
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middle-income countries in comparison to LICs, largely due to greater but riskier trade
integration. Upper-middle income countries also fared worse than lower-middle income
countries.
Figure 1: GDP Growth Globally and by Income Group, as a percentage (2006‐2011)
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Source: Constructed from the IMF, WEO Database (September 2011) with the country classifications of the World Bank, April 2011.
For a list of countries used see Appendix A.

Figure 1 shows the difference in average GDP growth between middle and lowincome groups during the crisis13. The results demonstrate that the poorest countries saw
on average less economic impact than MICs. Export growth decelerated much sooner and
further in MICs (Figure 2Error! Reference source not found.): growth contracted -7
percent and -5.6 percent in 2009 in upper- and lower-MICs, respectively, compared to 1.8
percent and 3.4 percent the year before. LICs meanwhile maintained positive export
growth, registering 8.5 percent in 2009 compared to 2.1 percent in 2008. LICs, however,
saw a lag in the decline of aggregate demand and reported a slowdown in export growth
in years 2009 and 2010 (10.8% both years) as sluggish demand continued. Growth in the

13

It should be noted that the differences among countries within these groups are stark, with volatile shifts in both export and
import growth from year to year, and some countries hover between the two income groups. Thus, this should be used as an
indication of the trend in flows between income groups.

5

volume of imports also slowed considerably more in upper-MICs in 2009 (-10.4%) in
comparison to lower-MICs (-3.4%) and LICs (-7.6%)14.
Figure 2: Global Growth of Volume of Exports of Goods and Services, as a percentage (2006‐2011)
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Source: Constructed from the IMF, WEO Database (September 2011) with the country classifications of the World Bank, April
2011. For a list of countries used see Appendix A.

The transmission mechanism further spread to LICs by way of currency
movements. The global meltdown spurred investors to liquidate their assets in many
countries, causing currency depreciation. Low aggregate demand also led to downward
pressures. Depreciation only caused investors to further transfer their portfolio allocations
to appreciating currencies for a higher rate of return, causing further depreciation. Again,
MICs with a higher amount of trade and financial flows saw greater volatility than LICs,
but variances rose across LICs. For example, the Ethiopian birr depreciated almost 45
percent15 from 2008 to 2010 against the US dollar while the Vietnamese dong saw almost
18 percent depreciation against the US Dollar in the same period. In general, those
countries with a flexible exchange rate system, including Vietnam, with a managed float

14

Calculated from IMF, WEO Database (September 2011); LICs have also seen a deeper decline in imports due to currency
depreciation.

15

Computed from the lowest value to the highest value in from Jan. 1, 2008‐Dec. 31, 2010 (Oanda.com).
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saw less volatility16. Currency depreciation can make other export sectors more attractive,
but limited infrastructure, supply bottlenecks, and sustained lower global demand
prevented many LICs from moving resources from one export sector to another to benefit
from changes. Instead, LICs relied on international reserves from export revenues to
stabilize their currencies and purchase more expensive imports.
By early 2011, trade flows and GDP growth had rebounded (Figure 1) but
continued to be below pre-crisis levels as sluggish and declining demand in advanced
countries remained. The eruption of debt crises in many European countries also
maintained fears. As a result, the IMF (WEO, October 2010) reported that imports by
advanced economies would remain below pre-crisis trends for years to come with
negative implications for emerging economies that depend upon export-led growth. This
is particularly worrisome for LICs who rely on these flows to fuel growth, and for their
governments that use export revenues from advanced countries to provide basic services.
Despite this, the estimated growth rate of LICs is projected to be lower than for other
countries (Figure 1), reflecting the economic constraints they face structurally that are
exacerbated by lower aggregate demand.
Rising Food and Fuel Prices
Second, the financial crisis initially lessened consumer demand and reduced
prices in many LICs. However, global food and fuel prices recovered in 2009 and have
since been climbing steadily, reigniting inflation concerns. Global food prices hit a record

16

World Bank, The Great Recession and Developing Countries: Economic Impact and Growth Prospects. Edited by Mustapha K. Nabli.
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank (2011): 36‐37.

7

high in February 2011, increasing 35 percent from the previous year17. As a result, the
World Food Program (WFP) reported that for 44 of the 63 countries studied, price trends
of the basic food basket had shifted upward more than 10 percent from the 5-year
average18. In some of the poorest countries, the cost had increased over 100 percent and
put many countries at high risk for food insecurity.
Higher prices have been blamed on disparities between world supply and demand
that have reduced food stocks and tightened markets. However, the financial crisis may
have further contributed as a result of currency depreciation. A UNCTAD-endorsed study
(Herrmann, 2009) found that currency depreciation from 2004-2008 has helped increases
commodity prices in 39 of 168 countries, only one of which being a developed country.
The study also cited price volatility due to increased speculation of commodity markets
as investors moved out of the declining real estate and stock markets. Domestic policies
that encourage food and oil stockpiles have also been charged. Coupled with the
continual rise in the price of oil, long-run food inflation is expected.
Rising prices affect countries differently depending upon domestic market
structures and fiscal and monetary policies. They particularly harm countries that are net
food and fuel importing countries (largely LICs) and further deteriorate their terms of
trade. This occurs as import prices rise disproportionately to export prices, which are
usually the cheaper primary commodities in LICs. Lustig (2008) found that the recent
food and fuel shocks deteriorated the terms of trade for 75 percent of 116 developing

17

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), FAO Food Price Index. 2011. http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs‐
home/foodpricesindex/en/ (accessed March 22 2011).

18

World Food Program (WFP), "The Market Monitor: Trends of staple food prices in vulnerable countries" (April 2011).

8

countries. This led to inflationary pressures and strained governments as they attempted
to mitigate the effects of rising prices.
At the microeconomic level, most poor households are net consumers of staple
food commodities and spend a larger proportion of their income (50-80 percent) on food
items. Rising food prices then disproportionately hurt them. Rising fuel costs—a
production input and transportation cost—also raised the price of many non-durable
consumer goods purchased by them. While not explored, reported coping mechanisms
included a reduction of nutrition, health services and education19 which have been
disparately felt by women and children20. In turn, this economic distress paired with
higher under- and un-employment manifested into social and political unrest21.
Financial Mechanism
Last, the crisis moved to LICs through the financial mechanism, despite
arguments they would be insulated by their shallow financial systems22. Even without
deep linkages, the past decade had seen a large increase in the amount of foreign actors
and inflows to LICs; illustratively inflows of FDI increased 1,257 percent from 20002008 to LICs23. Integration provided critical capital resources but also created a conduit
through which global financial movements were transmitted (Stiglitz, 2010). The areas of
greatest impact in LICs were asset quality, lending including trade finance, portfolio
19

For more on coping mechanisms, see Henk‐Jan Brinkman, et al, "High Food Prices and the Global Financial Crisis Have Reduced
Access to Nutritious Food and Worsened Nutritional Status and Health." The Journal of Nutrition 140, no. 1 (January 2010): 154‐161.

20

Studies show this is disparate given the fact that women and children comprised 70 percent of the world’s hungry in 2007 (Rania
Antonopoulos, “The Current Economic and Financial Crisis: A Gender Perspective.” Working Paper No. 562, Bureau for Development
Policy, Gender Team, United Nations Development Program (May 2009): 26).

21

For example, higher prices have resulted in recent food riots in many developing countries.

22

For this project, a shallow financial system refers to a lack of or limited money and capital markets. Banking is usually centralized
and offers few financial products. Stock and bond markets are limited or nonexistent, also limiting financial products. Additionally,
the government tends to remain the primary borrower with less participation from the private sector.

23

Computed from UNCTAD, UNCTADstat Database (2011)
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investment and FDI. ODA, remittances, and international loans, while important, are
explored briefly24.
In the banking sector, LICs felt the effects primarily through decreased asset
quality, global liquidity and access to credit. The number of non-performing loans
(NPLs) in many LICs increased as borrowers, facing income reductions, defaulted.
International bank lending also declined in some LICs as the reduction in liquidity
trickled down from the foreign parent bank to the domestic subsidiary bank. Additionally,
the global credit crunch forced up interest rates, as the supply of credit in formal
institutions fell. This reduced lending largely to the private sector. Other non-bank
financial institutions in LICs, including microfinance institutions that serve many of the
unbanked in LICs, also reported a reduction in financial lending25. Impact and recovery
varied, determined by its ownership, initial capitalization and regulatory system.
There is also some evidence that banks and private companies reduced sources of
trade finance, including letters of credit (from banks) and trade credit (between buyers
and sellers). This harmed producers in LICs who use these tools to smooth the bumps
between the time and placement of the order. One estimate argued that because of the
financial crisis, the reduction in trade finance to developing countries could create a $25
billion gap in supply and demand to producers worldwide (Aubion, 2009). The results,
though, have been largely anecdotal and more concentrated in Latin America and the
Caribbean26. This is not to say other LICs in other parts of the world have not been
24

They are not explored in detail partially because did not see large shifts but were largely resilient.

25

Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), "The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Microfinance Institutions and Their Clients:
Results from CGAP's 2009 Opinion Survey." 2009. Results from CGAP’s 2009 Opinion Survey. 2009.

26

John Humphrey, "Trade financing: Is it a barrier to Africa's exports?" VOX. April 28, 2009.
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3507 (accessed August 20 , 2011).
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affected: letters of credit from foreign banks to Bangladesh have been reduced in
response to lower export growth in their own countries27. Decreases in trade credit have
also been reported in Africa, but primarily in West Africa28. Instead, reports in LICs have
centered on lower global and domestic credit access in general.
The global decline also caused reductions in FDI and portfolio investment. FDI
fell almost 40 percent globally from 2008 to 200929. As a percentage of GDP, the amount
of FDI to MICs (13.2%) was more than double than the amount to LICs (6.5%) in 200830.
However, net FDI fell only slightly more in MICs in 2009 (22.9%) than in LICs
(21.6%)31. While LICs had fewer inflows to begin, capital flight may have been
comparable as investors moved their assets to perceived safer havens, i.e. MICs. Portfolio
investment also fell in many LICs, but again deeper in countries in which it had a larger
stake to begin with32. The effect of these declines varies, but ideally, these flows would
supply critical capital to encourage production, create jobs, increase incomes and reduce
poverty. In reality, the results are mixed, as the potential benefits depend on the initial
institutions and development in the host country to capture any spillover effects33.
Nevertheless, the decline increased pressures on governments and domestic financial
systems in LICs as import duties and tax revenues also dried up.
27

"Indian banks discourage importing Bangladeshi goods," Weekly Blitz. September 12, 2011.
http://www.weeklyblitz.net/1792/indian‐banks‐discourage‐importing‐bangladeshi (accessed September 29, 2011).

28

John Humphrey, "Are Exporters in Africa Facing Reduced Availability of Trade Finance." Institute of Development Studies,
Brighton, UK, March 2009.

29

This was a drop from $593 billion to $359 billion (World Bank, World dataBank (2011)).

30

UNCTAD, UNCTADstat Database (2011).

31

Ibid.

32

Illustratively, in a World Bank study of several developing countries, India, China and Poland and Turkey had large stock market
gains that saw significant outflows in comparison to the Philippines, Malaysia and Ethiopia that had smaller stock market
capitalization increases before the crisis (World Bank, The Great Recession and Developing Countries (2011): 23).
33
For a research and discussion on this, see Dabla‐Norris, et al (2010) and Kozul‐Wright and Rowthorn (1998).
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The financial crisis also moved to LICs through changes in ODA. Like FDI, ODA
is a critical source of government revenue for many LICs. Thus, any decline in the
volume of ODA threatened government expenditures on important programs and services
often directed at vulnerable groups. The results show ODA fell globally from 128 billion
in 2008 to 120 billion (6.25%) in 2009 but not as steep as predicted34. In fact, some LICs
saw aid amounts increase in response to the financial and food crises35. However, in
many cases, foreign aid funding from advanced countries was not as prioritized as
domestic pressures require greater attention, and financial commitments did not increase
at the rate needed36.
Last, experts debated the possible implications of a decline in remittances from
the Great Recession, as they account for over $400 billion and are closely tied to
household spending on human development37. In theory, a decline in migrants’ income
due to depressed global demand and output should reduce remittance flows. One study
estimated that remittances could fall 3-7 percent in the majority of African countries, the
continent with the highest number of LICs38. To date, remittances to LICs were more
resilient than other types of financial flows; both case studies recorded positive growth
but at a slower rate. This is attributed to the fact that most LICs do not have large

34

Some predicted the results from the Great Recession would be similar to or deeper than past crises where ODA has fallen 20‐25%
(Dang, et al (2009)).

35

Ethiopia for example, saw its aid flows increase 21 percent in 2010 (World Bank, The Great Recession and Developing Countries,
2011: 219).

36

Helene Cooper. "Economic Crisis Sidelines Fate of the World's Poorest." The New York Times. November 11, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/world/11aid.html?_r=1&emc=eta1 (accessed December 2010, 15).
For example, in October 2010 donor countries pledged $11.7 billion to the Global Fund to fight HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis and
malaria for 2011‐2013 but this was under the projected $17‐20 billion needed to fight these diseases (See Doughton (2010)).

37

World Bank, The Great Recession and Developing Countries (2011): 28.

38

Adolfo Barajas, et al, "The Global Financial Crisis and Workers' Remittances to Africa: What's the Damage?" WP/10/24,
International Monetary Fund, January 2010.
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numbers of migrants in developed countries, where the crisis hit hardest, and remittances
have been found to be highly correlated to factors outside of income levels39.
A Framework: Transmission Linked to Structural Vulnerability
Questions quickly arise as to why these channels functioned the way in which
they did, and how they differed among LICs. The answers link to each country’s initial
structural economic and financial vulnerabilities. This section discusses some of the key,
interrelated weaknesses that characterize many LICs, including Bangladesh and Zambia:
narrow exports that are low-valued and use little technology, and shallow financial
systems. Interwoven into the case studies, these vulnerabilities help explain how each
LIC became more susceptible to the crisis, understand the variances that arose among
LICs, and highlight the areas in which development challenges remain.
To begin, many LICs have a narrow export concentration with limited
connections to other parts of the economy. Ricardo (1817) argued for trade according to a
country’s comparative advantage, determined by differences in productivity of labor that
made international trade necessary. The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model later40 argued that
each nation would export the commodity that more intensely used its abundant, cheaper
factor (capital or labor). Assuming perfect factor mobility, its corollary argued factorprice equalization through trade (Samuelson, 1948). However, it soon became evident
that many LICs only held a comparative advantage in low-priced, labor-intensive primary

39

For a discussion on some of the determinants of remittances, see Ilene Grabel, "The Political Economy of Remitttances: What Do
We Know? What do we Need to Know?" Political Economic Research Institute Working Paper No. 184 (October 2008).

40
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commodities, and the return on capital and wage rates would not converge41. This reality
results from factors including but not limited to: colonial history, geographic luck,
political instability and social patterns that all influence and limit economic decisions and
conditions in a country. Given these other variables, LICs do not have the same amount
of technology, discussed below, or face the same trade barriers and/or factor constraints
as other higher-income countries. Instead, growth in LICs often becomes concentrated
rather than balanced—or spread out—among several industries.
While often unavoidable, export concentration in one sector carries long-term
consequences. As Nurkse (1957) argued, concentration in a single industry, i.e.
agriculture, makes it more difficult or impossible for the price mechanism and small
market alone to create mutually supporting industries that improve productivity within
sectors. Without resources cultivated in other sectors, the ability to increase aggregate
output, income, purchasing power and the standard of living are limited. Instead, Nurkse
(1957) argued for balanced growth with induced investment in several industries as, “first
and foremost a means of getting out of a rut, a means of stepping up the rate of growth
when the external forces of advance through trade expansion and foreign capital are
sluggish or inoperative” (p. 248).
However, balanced growth is often unfeasible given inadequate resources and
capacity. Noting this, Hirschman (1958) later argued that development is a process,
without starting and stopping points, and with continual disequilibria. As a result,
balanced growth in all industries would not be required so as the imbalances, or
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other variables.
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destabilization, created the proper connections within and between sectors. He argued for
both “backward and forward linkages” that utilized complementary effects42 to encourage
export diversification into higher-value added manufacturing and to increase net wealth.
A backward linkage would be created as one sector provided inputs required by another
to make the current product while a forward linkage would emerge when the current
finished product was used (or became an input) in another sector. Critically, by nature,
industrialization would give way to more linkage opportunities.
Disequilibria that induced these types of linkages, however, would not occur from
economic forces alone but required deliberate actions by external actors to serve as an
impetus to an investment series. This investment would also require improved technology
and training. The early H-O model assumed all firms were on a common production
function that used the same technology (same access), that factor price ratios determined
technological processes, and that new processes transferred easily from among countries
and firms43. Later, endogenous growth models argued that technological change is
actually endogenous, determined by country-specific variables44. Moreover, the evidence
demonstrated that those countries and regions with a technology-intensive specialization
yielded higher spillovers—or positive externalities—to other industries and as a result,
developed quicker. Again, this was higher in industrial processes and did not occur
automatically.
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Instead, in order for technology to be captured and adapted in developing
countries, targeted efforts at both the firm and national levels were needed. These efforts
would need to overcome market failures and to increase knowledge by leveraging current
financial and human capital resources to create incentives in certain sectors to make
technology worthwhile, to increase the capabilities of the sector to absorb the technology,
and to develop technological effort to go out and acquire the technology (Lall, 1992).
Summarizing Lall (1992) wrote,
“It is the interplay of all these factors…that determines at the firm level how well
producers learn the skills and master the information needed to cope with
industrial technology and, at the national level, how well countries employ their
factor endowments, raise those endowments over time, and grow dynamically in
the context of rapidly changing technologies” (p. 180-181).
Unfortunately, the actors and actions needed to acquire and/or adapt the technology to
create the spillovers are non-existent or too weak in LICs, leaving them few growth
opportunities.
With little opportunity for diversification, LICs remain dependent on low-priced
exports that are vulnerable to deteriorating terms of trade. As Prebisch (1950, 1959) and
Singer (1950) argued, the “periphery”–the majority of which is LICs—produce primary
commodities and minerals based on comparative advantage. However, these goods
undergo more volatile price changes than other goods that often make them a price taker.
Known as the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, this makes them vulnerable to global
fluctuations and low export demand. This deteriorates their terms of trade over time as
the price of exports declines while the price of imports (a large portion being
manufactured goods) rises. Thus, in order for the periphery to receive the same amount of
now more expensive imports, it must produce and export more lower-priced
16

commodities. This becomes more challenging as consumers in advanced countries,
earning a higher income, substitute higher-valued products for lower-valued, primary
products.
The hypothesis further argues that this phenomenon works against LICs as they
face higher prices of capital-intensive imports needed for expansion and diversification.
In recent years, this argument has been extended to low-end manufactures, including lowend garments (UNTCAD, 2002). Both case study countries demonstrated this struggle:
both saw their terms of trade deteriorate as the value of imports rose faster than that of
exports. As a result, they struggled to afford capital-intensive imports needed for
economic growth and instead amassed debt. To counteract this trend, Prebisch and Singer
recommended LICs initiate a process of directed import substitution industrialization
along with export diversification to reduce dependency. In many LICs, including
Bangladesh and Zambia, this was largely not done, making them more vulnerable and
less competitive.
The above problems are compounded and caused in part by shallow financial
systems including a lack of monetary resources to effectively raise and utilize capital.
Most LICs have little or no formal banking institutions and limited financial products.
Most lack or have limited stock and bond markets that constrain financial flows, and the
government remains the largest borrower in many LICs. Early economists quickly
noticed the problems that arise from a lack of capital resources and systems: RosensteinRodan (1943) concluded from his study of underdeveloped areas that the absence of this
outside “push” to train large, unskilled labor forces and adopt new research and
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technology slows the process of industrialization. Market forces alone leave little
incentive for investment, as it remains unprofitable.
In a similar manner, Nurkse (1961) later wrote on the struggle for capital
formation in underdeveloped countries, “a country is poor because it is poor…” with a
cyclical relationship that “afflicts the accumulation of capital in economically backward
countries” (p. 4-5). He explained that the supply of capital is limited by low savings and a
small market. A lack of capital decreases productivity, further reducing incomes and
savings. On the demand side, low capital results from low induced investment, low
purchasing power, and low incomes which result from low productivity and low capital
to begin with. The low level of income from low productivity is common to both.
Without enough economic push and with high poverty characterized by low incomes,
LICs then find it difficult to mobilize investment to increase productivity. Instead, they
become trapped in Nurkse’s “vicious cycle” of underdevelopment.
Moreover, in trying to attract additional financial resources, LICs often reduce
adequate controls of financial products and foreign participation and investment. In the
short-run, this encourages unregulated, riskier international financial flows that can cause
currency appreciation with inflows and capital flight with outflows, seen again during the
crisis. In the long-run, the benefits of foreign flows may not be captured without the
capacity of its institutions needed (Hermes and Lensink, 2004). Instead, the associated
costs, i.e. environmental degradation and income inequality, will outweigh the benefits,
causing further economic vulnerability.

18

Selection of Zambia and Bangladesh
With this understanding, two cases are examined: Bangladesh and Zambia. Both
LICs were at high risk to the financial crisis through the traditional channels. In both
cases, trade flows were the primary transmission mechanism, while the financial
mechanism had less impact. Additionally, in both cases, the manner and depth of the
transmission mechanisms linked to each country’s economic and financial vulnerabilities.
Prior to the Great Recession, both countries had emerged from colonialism and
adopted then-popular paths of development: nationalization of industries that maintained
heavy state control of key industries. Both countries began to pursue slowly an exportpromotion strategy but economic development remained weak due to many of the reasons
discussed above, encouraging export concentration (more than 70% of revenues from one
source). By the 1980s, international and domestic pressures encouraged neoliberal
prescriptions that led to trade liberalization. Financial liberalization also increased but
remained limited as private and foreign investment remained small. Politically, both
countries moved toward democratic governments in the early 1990s and saw increased
financial flows, economic growth, decreased poverty45, and human development.
Nevertheless, they maintained old and created new challenges.
Bangladesh and Zambia also demonstrated key differences at the outset, besides
location. Zambia’s rich geography encouraged dependency on extractive minerals—
copper and cobalt—that routinely underwent volatile price changes. In contrast,
Bangladesh’s low-cost labor fostered its reliance on labor-intensive garments. Trade
direction also varied and as a percentage of GDP, Zambia was more open than
45

Poverty in Zambia is roughly 59.3 percent while poverty in Bangladesh is roughly 40 percent according to national poverty lines
(World Bank, World dataBank (2011)).
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Bangladesh46. In 2007, both had increasing trade volumes but Zambia continued to have
a trade deficit47. In the financial sector, Zambia had higher levels of foreign involvement
in its money and capital markets, with larger amounts of FDI and foreign portfolio
investment to GDP than Bangladesh48. In Bangladesh, the state and domestic actors had a
higher level of involvement in both sectors49. Remittances also were higher in
Bangladesh50. Zambia received more ODA but also a higher poverty level, plagued by
HIV/AIDs51.
As will be explored, these factors and others defined their development paths
early on, creating shared and unique economic and financial vulnerabilities. These
established the trajectory of their individual experiences, and presented particular
challenges for their future growth. To the degree in which their experiences converge,
they offer lessons for other LICs seeking economic and human development as part of an
interconnected but risky global system.
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WEO Database (September 2011)).
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CHAPTER TWO: BANGLADESH CASE STUDY
Delayed Impact but Slow Recovery
At the onset of the global financial crisis, development experts estimated the
possible impacts to the South Asian country of Bangladesh. The World Bank (2009)
study of the previous chapter categorized it as highly exposed to the effects of the
financial crisis. This came from its initial high level of poverty (40%) and estimates that
GDP would fall 2-3 percent annually52. As will be shown, these concerns were rooted in
the country’s economic and financial features coupled with rising global prices and
competition. In fact, Bangladesh did not suffer as expected but also did not completely
avert the crisis. Instead, the crisis further exposed the underlying vulnerabilities of the
country’s trade and financial sectors.
This chapter develops these conclusions in the following format: first, it
demonstrates how the trade transmission transferred the crisis to Bangladesh with
subsequent effects on exports and imports and as a result, its currency, unemployment,
and government revenues. The effects of the trade transmission are then linked to
Bangladesh’s initial structural vulnerabilities. It then looks at how the financial
mechanism affected the LIC and connects the mechanism to its shallow financial system.
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It concludes with economic and policy recommendations for the country to address these
weaknesses amidst rising competition and slow growth.
The Great Recession and its Trade Transmission (2008-2010)
By 2008, Bangladesh’s economy was booming: it had registered its highest GDP
growth rate ever at 6.5 percent (Figure 3), and its trade openness had reached 43.4
percent53. Its economic structure consisted of 30 percent industrial goods, including
garments and textiles, 20 percent agriculture and 50 percent services. Exports amounted
for roughly one-tenth of GDP but the large majority (85%) went to advanced countries
including the United States and in the European Union (EU). Exported goods included
textiles and apparels, leather, footwear, jute and jute products, but the multi-billion dollar
ready-made garment (RMG) industry alone comprised 75 percent of export revenues and
averaged 15 percent annual growth54. Imports included capital machinery and equipment,
textiles and RMG inputs, food, chemicals, crude oil, and petroleum.
Ready-made garments include woven and knitwear products. Woven products
include t-shirts, shirts and trousers. Knitwear products entail socks, stockings,
undergarments and soft garments like t-shirts and sweaters. In 2008, there were over
4,000 RMG firms in the country, serving as one of the largest employers and the largest
source of foreign exchange earnings55. The majority of firms were locally but privatelyowned. The industry by nature is low-cost and labor-intensive, utilizing economies of
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scale for large production. This is a comparative advantage for Bangladesh, which has an
extremely cheap but low-skilled population of 162 million people.
Figure 3: Bangladesh GDP growth, constant prices as a
percentage (1995‐2011)
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Figure 4: Bangladesh Growth of Volume of Exports and
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Given its high integration with Western markets and little export diversification,
the evidence shows that the greatest impacts to the LIC from the recession were in the
areas of exports and imports with accompanying effects in the labor market and
government revenues, but were not to the large extent predicted.
In looking at exports, Bangladesh’s economy remained robust at first because of
its narrow concentration in both types of products and numbers of buyers. The RMG
industry continued to drive growth and upheld export revenues until the first quarter of
FY2009, registering 12.7 percent growth56 (Figure 5). While non-RMG export57 growth
fell, total export growth remained positive due to the RMG industry. This was possible
due to preplaced agreements with giant retailers. Given the lead-time required to get
garments, large retailers often negotiate orders at a certain price per unit well in advance.
56
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Based on its cheap labor, this allowed Bangladesh to keep producing garments to fill
these orders. Additionally, its RMG exports have a low but positive income elasticity of
demand. The so-called Wal-Mart effect, consumers with higher incomes substituted
higher-priced goods with cheaper goods, i.e. garments while consumers with lower
incomes maintained their demand of lower-priced goods, i.e. garments. This gave
producers and the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) more export revenues to rely upon58
and time to prepare.
It was not until September 2009, almost a year after the crisis hit the rest of the
world, that Bangladesh registered negative growth in total exports. The eventual impact
was also a result of its narrow export composition and direction: over 80 percent of its
RMG exports went to advanced countries where the crisis originated, servicing large
clothing retailers like Wal-Mart and Old Navy in the United States, Canada and the EU.
As a result, declining wealth and income in these advanced countries eventually reduced
demand for Bangladeshi garment exports. When preplaced orders were filled, inventories
were depleted, garment demand then declined and production finally fell. As a result, the
rate of growth in RMG exports alone fell 28.6 percent from the first nine months of 2009
compared to the same period the year before (Figure 2.3). Given its large share, this
reduced the potential for overall export growth, and it rose only slightly: 16.65 percent in
2010 from 16.55 percent in 2009. This was a sharp reversal from an impressive 11.3
percent gain in the rate of export growth in 2008 (Figure 4).
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Without its high dependence on the RMG industry that secured reserves, it may not have fared as well as its other sectors saw an
automatic response to declines in global demand.
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Figure 5: Bangladesh’s Quarterly Export Growth, as a percentage (July 2008‐Sept. 2009)
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Source: Constructed from Bangladesh Export Promotion Bureau. Export Statistics Database (2011)

Despite a change in exports, Bangladesh saw less volatility its exchange rate in
comparison to other LICs, including Zambia. This is because the Bangladesh Bank (BB)
stabilized the Bangladeshi taka against the dollar by buying or selling dollars when
needed, using its large pool of stored reserves. Illustratively, the amount of international
reserves increased by only $363 million in 2010 compared to a $4,530 million increase in
200959. Using reserves, the taka then appreciated only 1.3 percent against the US dollar
from its highest to its lowest value from September 2008 to September 200960. However,
the weakening of the dollar during this period against other major currencies led to a
depreciation of the taka against these same currencies; the taka depreciated 1.01 percent
against the euro and 8.9 percent against the rupee61.
Looking at the labor market, it can be seen that Bangladesh’s historical reliance
on its labor-intensive, low-valued exports helped weaken the initial impact of the crisis.
Most factories continued production, making a profit off the quantity sold rather than the
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price of garments sold. As a result, the unemployment rate rose just .1 percent to 3.7
percent in FY2009/1062 from the year before. This was a relief as the sector employs over
2.5 million people, 90 percent of which are women and who represent some of the
poorest people63. However, while a large amount of people, this is still small in relation to
the entire population. Nevertheless, the labor market did not go entirely unaffected: over
30,000 garment workers were reported to have lost their jobs in the first nine months of
the 2009 with other undocumented losses in the informal labor market64.
Additionally, employment may have remained stable as producers utilized other
cost-cutting methods. This follows a UNTCAD study (2002) that found that lowtechnological, labor-intensive manufacturing industries in LICs are more able to repress
wages by relying on low-skilled workers. In Bangladesh, the recession brought reports of
factories reducing benefits, hours, overtime, and underutilizing production capacity, all of
which reduced take-home wages, delayed new hires and reduced workers’ productivity.
Child labor has also been reportedly increased65. These tactics raised human rights
concerns and labor riots66. There has been no evidence that this trend has reversed, and
estimates predict the labor supply will continue to outmatch job creation in upcoming
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years67. As investors and buyers become more stringent about labor rights and
productivity, this could reduce future garment orders.
Still another impact of the transmission, imports declined with exports68.
Sustained RMG production first kept import growth strong in the first quarter of
FY2008/09. However, imports fell with exports and registered -19 percent growth at their
lowest point (Figure 6). Import growth was only then 9.6 percent in 2010, compared to 21
percent in 200969. Capital machinery, textiles and RMG inputs saw the greatest declines
in growth as production of RMG exports fell. Food imports also fell due to higher global
food and petroleum prices. A stronger agricultural sector also increased local
production70 and helped offset more expensive imports and rising food inflation71. This
likely supported poor families that saw purchasing power fall.
Figure 6: Bangladesh’s Quarterly Import Growth, as a percentage (July 2008‐Sept. 2009)
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In the short-term, the import decline had a two-fold effect on the Bangladeshi
economy. On the one hand, it improved its balance of payments (BoP) situation. A
simultaneous decline in reserves for import payments with declining export revenues
could have further deteriorated its trade position. On the other hand, the reduction in the
volume of imports resulted in a reduction of import duties by 2.6 percent from 2008 to
200972. Value-added tax and supplementary duties also fell. These revenues were
especially critical as they accounted for roughly 30 percent of the total domestic revenue
of the national budget73. Coupled with declines in foreign investment, ODA, and lower
export revenues, the trade transmission then presented fiscal challenges to the GoB as
expenditures continued to rise. As a result, government borrowing also rose (Figure 7).
Figure 7: GoB Revenues, Expenditures and Borrowing/Lending, as a percentage of GDP (2000‐2012)
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Figure 8: Bangladesh’s Current Account Balance, in US Billions (2006‐2012)
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Thus, it is clear the trade transmission had several economic impacts on
Bangladesh. The impacts were delayed, but a decline in global aggregate demand
eventually caused exports and imports to decline. This deteriorated the LIC’s BoP from
$3.3 billion in 2009 to $2.3 billion in 2010, or 24.5 percent (Figure 8). This occurred as
imports (largely of RMG inputs) fell while export growth remained stagnant. The trade
transmission had subsequent negative effects on unemployment and underemployment,
and government revenues. These could have long-term impacts at the micro level. The
impact of the transmission linked to Bangladesh’s structural vulnerabilities: high export
concentration that relied on labor-intensive, low technological processes that resulted
from economic decisions and conditions leading up to the crisis. This is explored below
in two periods: independence to the early 198574 and 1985 to the crisis in 2008.
Trade Transmission Linked to Structural Vulnerability
First Period (1971-1985)
In this first period, Bangladesh emerged as an independent nation in 1971 from
Pakistan following a civil war that left the country and its citizens destitute. Formerly
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East Pakistan, the Pakistani government largely had ignored the region. Agriculture
served as the region’s primary industry by utilizing its fertile soil and ample water
supply. The jute industry was the country’s largest industry, exporter and employer.
However, the sector relied heavily on traditional agricultural methods and low world
prices. The textile industry, while not as large, had been developed under the previous
colonization period75 using the region’s water supply and abundant labor force for
chemical processing and assembling. However, it had fallen by the wayside due to a lack
of public or private investment to make critical upgrades.
At independence, the new government nationalized all large textile mills from
previous Pakistani owners to take back control of the industry. The GoB organized the
factories under the Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation (BTMC) and subsidized the
upgrade of and imports needed for textile mills. The real growth catalyst however was
preferential international trade agreements. The establishment of the international MultiFiber Agreement (MFA)76 in 1974 limited the amount of exported garments and other
textiles to certain developed countries. The agreement allotted poor countries larger quota
amounts. This allowed most Bangladeshi garment exports to enter the EU and USA dutyfree, and its abundant cheap labor offered its buyers low prices. This encouraged
investment and growth in the RMG industry, as the imposition of quotas incentivized
international buyers and investors to shift their demand. By the decade’s end, monetary
and labor resources had moved further away from the agricultural sector, and RMG had
quickly replaced jute as the primary export industry.
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Critical observations from this early period largely underscore the creation of
Bangladesh’s dependence on one export source with few opportunities for export
diversification. Notably, it is unlikely the textile industry would have grown without this
protection period. The government’s early role in the industry provided the institutional
impetus, but favorable quota restrictions gave its exports the economic advantage needed
to compete internationally. Referenced in Chapter One, protection policies—including
quota restrictions—in LICs can help them overcome economic barriers that perpetuate
underdevelopment including narrow, low-value, low-tech exports that often give way to
deteriorating terms of trade. They do so by keeping the benefits of acquired technical
progress in the country, helping raise productivity and domestic incomes and giving the
infant, underdeveloped industry time and tools to develop77.
In Bangladesh, the protection of a quota system initiated economic growth in the
stagnant textile industry and pushed the country away from traditional agricultural
exports to low-end manufactures. However, this growth became extremely unbalanced
and concentrated in the RMG industry: the ratio of RMG exports to total exports only
increased. Destabilization did not give way to Hirschman’s (1958) strong linkages.
Bangladesh’s garment industry works by turning cotton and/or other fibers into yarn
using spinning processes, yarn to grey fabrics using weaving or knitting processes, and
grey fabrics to finished products using dyeing and printing processes. Thus, backward
linkages include improvements to raw materials and machinery for production processes.
Instead, Bangladesh early on established a system in which it imported its textile inputs
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from surrounding countries, giving it little control over the quality and timing received78.
In a similar manner, poor distribution and marketing perpetuated by a lack of key
transport, infrastructure and energy investments hampered forward linkages.
Upon analysis, these linkages largely remained limited due to an inadequate
amount of effective planning and investment. Illustratively, the GoB and private actors
could not and/or did not adopt large-scale national-directed efforts to acquire higher
technology and/or training. Following Lall (2000), unlike other countries, the GoB did
not institute national policies that could have incentivized and assisted firms, both private
and public, to overcome market challenges of imperfect information and costly
technology. This kept the Bangladeshi garment industry at the low-technology end of the
RMG market where value-added and profit margins were small. Instead, it continued to
rely on labor costs as the primary element of its competitiveness. As it did so, its terms of
trade deteriorated as its export prices fell disproportionately to the cost of its imports
(Figure 9).
Figure 9: Bangladesh’s Net Barter Terms of Trade, 2000=100 (1980‐2009)
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Meanwhile, its largest competitors, i.e. China and India, embraced a more
balanced export-promotion strategy earlier on79. They instituted a coordinated effort to
substitute imports with domestic inputs by encouraging strong backward linkages to the
agricultural sector. This fed the manufacturing sector its necessary imports. Illustratively,
they subsidized the production of cotton at home to provide a cost and time advantage
that improved productivity. For the remaining imported inputs, they used incentives, i.e.
lower import duties, to improve delivery and quality. They also made critical investments
in technology and training. Discussed below, this required a strategic approach to utilize
financial flows. These policies attracted further investment and allowed them to move
into medium-technology products that were more capital intensive and required higher
skills (Lall, 2000)80. In Bangladesh, this period of protection did not successfully
establish the policies or linkages necessary to develop and diversify further but instead
encouraged greater export concentration.
Second Period (1985-2008)
In the second period, the industry continued to grow under the MFA, but the
absence of key linkages and spillovers became more apparent. The industry fell behind
due to a lack of strategic planning, accountability and adequate infrastructure. The BMTC
also came under scrutiny due to poor management and corruption allegations. In 1985,
Western markets imposed smaller MFA quotas on Bangladeshi exports, slowing RMG
growth. To ameliorate the situation, the GoB turned to the IMF. It argued that
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Bangladesh should rely on its comparative advantage and remove any barriers, including
government participation, to correct macroeconomic imbalances and attract investment.
This neoliberal view argued that government inference had thwarted market forces,
discouraged further economic development and prevented the linkages necessary to allow
the industry to withstand international competition81.
This went against the findings of many of the economists discussed in Chapter
One who argued that market forces alone would actually work against the country. The
GoB agreed to Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) to correct macroeconomic
imbalances and to improve its financial climate. The SAPs focused on liberalization and
privatization of the industry, away from the centralized control of the BMTC. The
reforms did not deliver the results promised, discussed below. GDP growth declined
further82 and deep deficits and high inflation remained.
In the early 1990s, the GoB transitioned from semi-autocratic rule to a
parliamentary democracy. In 1995, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing (ATC) phased out all MFA quotas by 2005. To adjust, the new government
implemented further macroeconomic reforms to increase trade and attract additional
investment83. These reforms, coupled with favorable international conditions helped the
industry grow. However, in 2000-2001, a decline in the US economy compounded by the
events of September 11, 2001, triggered a global recession. Macroeconomic shocks
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quickly rippled throughout the global economy and reduced Bangladesh’s export
demand. Holding now over 76 percent of total exports revenues in the RMG industry, a
decline in export demand hit Bangladesh hard. In total, export earnings declined 7.5
percent and GDP growth fell .7 percent from 2000 to 200184. However, export demand
rebounded as soon as international conditions improved: Bangladesh was able to
increase the volume of exports in spite of lower prices85.
Key observations from this second period also demonstrate the creation of key
vulnerabilities aggravated again in the 2008 crisis. Beforehand, Bangladesh’s competitors
continued to face high tariff restrictions in the garment industry while Bangladesh largely
did not. Instead, it continued to rely on high volumes of low-end exports maintained by
cheap labor to capitalize on large rents. Now, in this second period of a phase out,
Bangladesh had already captured the lower-end of the market but could not move into the
higher-end of the market where it could have received more quota allowances86. The
safety net was then completely removed.
While many economists agree that protection policies should be taken away when
the domestic industry can stand alone87, there is disagreement on the timeframe and
recipe to do so. Developing countries with limited exports and financial resources often
face higher adjustment costs associated with the removal of trade barriers. Adjustment
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costs are higher in these countries given their underdevelopment and include, but are not
limited to, higher impacts to unskilled labor, greater implementation costs from weaker
political and economic institutions, and few social safety nets (Charlton and Stiglitz,
2005).
In the case of Bangladesh, the adjustment period and reforms occurred in phases
but did not address many of its internal vulnerabilities. Instead, they largely focused on
increasing trade and financial liberalization by removing the GoB from the RMG industry
and other industrial sectors, helping to make the adjustment costs greater. Bangladesh
now largely lacked the national support necessary to make the large, overarching reforms
in technology, training and infrastructure needed to develop the garment industry or other
sectors by way of strong linkages or spillovers (Lall, 2000). Following Nurkse’s (1961)
argument, the low productivity in these sectors from a small amount of investment and
savings only maintained low levels of capital formation. This only encouraged further
export concentration in low-end RMG garments that led to quantitative rather than
qualitative (higher-value) growth.
Additionally, this export concentration allowed Bangladesh to accumulate a large
level of international reserves. Illustratively, the amount of international reserves,
including gold, increased 248 percent from 2000-2007. This had a two-fold effect. First,
aligned with the literature, this was an insurance source during times of economic decline
and illiquidity, helping to stabilize its currency88. This helped the LIC during the 20012002 slowdown and funded the continuation of imports needed for garment production.
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Bangladesh repeated this strategy in the Great Recession: reliance on reserves and export
growth fueled by volume rather than price. On the other hand, it also reduced pressures to
worry about its export dependence. As Hauner (2005) found, reserve accumulation also
carries high costs: in Bangladesh, the high-level from one source seems to have
discouraged the need to develop other export revenue sources, and reserve stockpiles
were not invested.
Therefore, by 2008, Bangladesh’s trade sector had several structural
vulnerabilities: it was undiversified, low-priced and labor-intensive. It used little
technology and relied heavily on imports for inputs. Without adequate public or private
policies to mobilize financial resources, discussed below, linkages and spillover effects
were limited. Global competition had also increased significantly in the new post-quota
system, and Bangladesh was losing its comparative advantage to countries that had
adopted higher-value industrialization processes earlier on. Meanwhile, high poverty
remained. Given these conditions, Bangladesh was categorized as highly vulnerable to
the transmission and poverty impacts in the World Bank (2009) study.
In fact, Bangladesh at first maintained high export growth by relying on its
narrow RMG export base that utilized preplaced orders to fuel quantity rather than price
growth and by storing the reserves from continued exports. However, it eventually saw
decline through the trade mechanism that aggravated these structural weaknesses. As the
global economy recovers, Bangladesh now faces a harsher environment. It receives dutyand quota-free access to the EU in low-end categories but so do its LIC competitors, i.e.
Cambodia and Pakistan. Meanwhile, it lacks the ability to move into higher-value
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garments where other competitors, i.e. China and India, hold a larger market share. It
also remains reliant on regional and bilateral trade agreements with regional partners for
RMG production inputs89. Discussed in Section Five, it must now work harder to
overcome these weaknesses.
The Great Recession and its Financial Transmission (2008-2010)
In contrast to the trade mechanism, the financial transmission had far less impact
on Bangladesh. By 2008, the country still had a centralized banking system and a small
capital market. This limited its participation in global financial markets and risky
products that were primary carriers to other countries. Nevertheless, its shallow financial
markets did endure the global economic downturn as asset quality and lending including
trade finance declined, and as the volume of FDI and private portfolio flows fell. All of
these, however, were marginal.
The Great Recession had some, but not alarming, effect on Bangladesh’s
domestic banking sector. This occurred through an increase in rate of growth of the
number of banks’ NPLs: borrowers faced declining incomes and defaulted on their loans,
increasing the growth rate in the number of NPLs from previous years to 9.2 percent of
total loans in 200990. This number was disproportionately higher in the State-Owned
Commercial Banks (SCBs) where the ratio rose to 21.3 percent in December 200991 .
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This deteriorated the asset quality of many of these banks and increased pressure on the
GoB to support them. The GoB offered short-term financial support, but it did not
address the underlying issues that caused the NPLs in the first place including risky
lending to the government itself, an inadequate legal and debt framework, poor loan
screening, a lack of accountability and an overall poor credit environment92. Discussed
below, the crisis then only exacerbated these problems.
As the money supply contracted, the Great Recession also affected Bangladesh’s
lending rate. The rate had been rising in the years prior and spiked in late 2007. It
remained high due to unstable macroeconomic conditions, high administrative costs, a
high NPL ratio and centralized market power that inhibited competition93. During the
Great Recession, it declined marginally in 2009 as the global economy slowed down and
illiquidity rose. The BB adopted expansionary monetary policies to lower the rate to
encourage domestic investment and reduce further liquidity problems (Figure 10). As a
result, lending to the private sector grew slowly at 2.9 percent to GDP in 2009 and then
sped up with liquidity injections in 201094. However, the interest rate quickly rose again
shortly after. International bank lending also did not fall much considering the low
proportion of foreign banks in the country (7%), discussed below. Trade finance in
particular may have been harder hit: there have been reports of reductions in letters of
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credit from Indian banks to Bangladeshi exporters95, and this seems likely to increase if
lower garment demand continues.
Figure 10: Bangladesh’s Interest Rate (2006‐2010)
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The Great Recession also impacted Bangladesh’s capital market, but only
marginally as portfolio investment and FDI were minimal to begin with (portfolio inflows
were .2 percent of GDP in 2007 while FDI inflows were .9 percent of GDP). Net
portfolio investment did fall as investors reversed inflows, and registered -159 million in
2009 compared to 47 million the year before96. Considering only 2 percent of market
capital comes from foreign capital, the effect was minimal and stock market
capitalization kept rising. FDI also saw some effect: inflows fell from $1 billion to $700
million from 2008 to 2009, or 1.3 percent to .7 percent of GDP (Figure 11)97. The largest
declines were in telecom and the power, gas and petroleum sectors. Neither portfolio
flows nor FDI flows have returned to pre-crisis levels, discussed below.
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Figure 11: FDI Inflows to Bangladesh, in US Millions (1990‐2009)
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In other financial flows, remittances remained resilient but the rate of growth
declined from 16.9 percent in 2009 to 5 percent in 201098. Total net disbursements of
ODA fell 12.7 percent or $104.9 million while total commitments fell 10.3 percent or
$186.14 million in the same period99. However, large development assistance continued:
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) country plan of 2011-2013 will bring $3.2 billion
for primary education, and energy and transport sector and a $7.9 million technical
assistance program. From 2008-2010, large international bank loans were not reported.
However, the IMF approved a no-conditional $1 billion loan in October 2011 to
Bangladesh under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the main funding tool of the IMF
to LICs to help with poverty alleviation and times of economic crisis100. This is likely to
cushion the negative effects Bangladesh has seen, or will see.
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Financial Transmission Linked to Structural Vulnerability
It is clear a history of limited, centralized financial development contributed to the
crisis’ impact in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is not considered internationally integrated101
and only really started to develop its financial system in the 1990s with its financial
sector reform program, discussed in Section Two. By 2008, it remained heavily
dependent on its centralized banking system and equity financing was extremely
limited102. Banks fell largely into two categories: SCBs under the Central Bank and
Private Commercial Banks (PCBs). Domestic banks far outweighed the number of
foreign banks: foreign commercial banks held only 7 percent of deposits in 2009 while
SCBs and PCBs held 87.6 percent103.
Formal banking was largely limited: only 25.5 percent of the population held a
bank account104 and its services constrained to urban areas. The sector continued to be
hampered by low savings, low incomes, poor infrastructure and low technical skills that
limited resource mobilization and financial intermediation. Lending was largely to the
public sector with short-term maturities105. Poor loan screening and asset quality were
also concerning, especially for SCBs. This contributed to risky lending and a larger
number of NPLs in Bangladesh’s banking sector in the years leading up to the crisis. To
101

Bangladesh receives a score of 20.0 for financial freedom from the 2011 Index of Economic Freedom; See Heritage Foundation,
"2011 Index of Economic Freedom: Bangladesh." Heritage Foundation. 2011. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/Bangladesh
(accessed July 23, 2011).

102

For example, market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) was 9.9 percent of GDP in 2007 (World Bank, World dataBank
(2011)).

103

Bangladesh Bank, "Chapter 5: Banking Sector Performance, Regulation and Bank Supervision." 2009 Annual Report (2009).

104

United Nations, "Building Inclusive Financial Sector for Development." 2006.

105

A majority of lending has a maturity period of less than three years (World Bank, End of MFA Quotas: Key Issues and Strategic
Options for Bangladesh Readymade Garment Industry. Bangladesh Development Series‐Paper No 2, Dhaka: The World Bank: Poverty
Reduction and Economic Management Unit (December 2005).

42

address this, the government routinely held up many SCBs, viewed as “too big to fail”.
As shown, these vulnerabilities resurfaced in the crisis.
Despite expansionary reforms, interest rates remained very high. High operational
costs, management inefficiencies and corruption, and cultural norms largely determined
the rates rather than traditional market movements. This issue was seen again during the
Recession: many countries saw their interest rates drop significantly, but the economic
slowdown pushed Bangladesh’s rate down only marginally. It climbed quickly back up
and remains particularly higher on working capital, trade financing and consumer loans.
The rate spread has also increased at an increasing rate in recent years with changes only
to the deposit rate, leaving the lending rate higher in Bangladesh. This has impacted the
RMG industry, inhibiting capital resources needed to make many of the trade
recommendations above. The Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Export
Association (BGMEA) reports profit margin losses around 30 percent due to high
borrowing rates that raise manufacturing costs106. Discussed below, as Bangladesh looks
forward, this could detour investors and lead them to its competitors with lower rates107.
Bangladesh’s capital market remained far less developed. By 2008, it had two
stock exchanges and a bond market, but the supply of stocks and the demand for bonds
were small. Instead, people relied on the banking sector where capital was easier to
acquire and carried less cost and risk. The absence of the RMG industry in the capital
market also discouraged financial development: these small and medium garment
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enterprises do not normally issue equities to raise capital. Thus, the capital market needed
more issuers but the number suppliers were limited without diversification away from
RMG industry. FDI was also limited: the GoB has allowed foreign ownership and
repatriation in most sectors but an official approval with significant paperwork is
required. This process has been reportedly slow and corrupt, discouraging investors108.
Instead, most FDI has gone to export-processing zones (EPZs) to encourage trade
liberalization but has not produced large spillover effects to domestic firms.
As a result, by 2008, Bangladesh’s banks and borrowers were limited in financial
products and access. Vice versa, the absence or underdevelopment of productivity,
technology and training left fewer incentives for the mobilization and utilization of
financial resources. Without both pieces in place, the LIC lacked sufficient capital
resources from both public and private actors to improve and diversify its economy
(Nurkse, 1961). On the other hand, its small integration with a limited number of foreign
investors significantly reduced its financial contagion from the crisis. Instead, its
problems largely reflected the weaknesses of its banking sector. As it recovers, it will
have to weigh the costs and benefits associated with this type of financial liberalization.
Moving Forward (2011 and Beyond)
Export Concentration and Associated Vulnerable Trade Characteristics
The evidence shows that low production costs at first allowed Bangladesh to
maintain export growth throughout 2008 by increasing its export volume despite
decreasing global prices. Preplaced, locked-in agreements and inelastic income elasticity
supported export growth early on. This combination gave the GoB more export revenues
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and policy options to rely upon before it saw declines in both exports and imports in late
2009. Nevertheless, the trade transmission eventually aggravated its weak export
structure of concentrated, low-valued, labor-intensive and low-tech exports. This led to a
decline in the rate of growth in trade flows that has not recovered.
Moving forward, Bangladesh must become more competitive in its current RMG
exports and diversify into higher-value garments. Without doing so, it will not be able to
utilize the same strategies as before. Instead, its competitors will have already filled a
large portion of these garment orders: China and India are capturing Bangladesh’s market
share and expanding into other garment markets109. Other LICs are also serious
contenders: Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007 that gave it access to larger markets, and
Cambodia and Pakistan have reduced production prices and lead-time110 to fill orders
quicker.
To strengthen its backward linkages in the RMG industry, Bangladesh must take
greater control of its production process to reduce its lead-time, fill orders faster and
diversify into higher-valued garments. One option is to produce more inputs at home. As
shown, the relationship between the agricultural and manufacturing sector was not
developed early on and remains weak, making it rely on imports along the RMG
production chain111. The agricultural sector employs more than half of the formal but
unskilled labor force. Sector transformation will require more economic incentives and
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training112, as cotton production—for example—is currently not as profitable as other
crops. This is the best option for long-term competitiveness, but may not be easy given
the agricultural sector’s traditional methods and the stress to produce more food in the
midst of rising food prices. Other short-term feasible solutions include using more
bonded warehouses to store imports in advance, expanding regional trade agreements for
inputs, and prioritizing infrastructure improvements to reduce transportation costs of
imports.
Bangladesh must also examine the productivity of its workers, another production
input. Its history shows that extremely low labor costs that utilize its large but poor and
uneducated population have created a comparative advantage in the industry. This also
helped it withstand the crisis by keeping its costs low as prices also fell. However, it has
also exposed the inherent problems associated with this type of cheap capital. Notably,
workers’ productivity levels are becoming less competitive: one study found that while
the best reported performance in Asia is 25.87 shirts per sewing labor unit, Bangladeshi
productivity is 8-20 shirts113. This is unattractive to mass retailers seeking more and faster
garment output per worker.
Additionally, this comparative advantage has encouraged cost-cutting techniques.
When export demand declined in 2009, many workers become un- or underemployed
with less income and little chance for additional skills training. The effects were further
transferred through a decline in incomes, savings and government revenues. In the future,
rising competition and increasing trade openness will likely push wages down further and
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put workers in more vulnerable situations, raising domestic and international concerns114.
Bangladesh must improve its working conditions and labor rights to increase investor
confidence. This will require efforts by multiple actors so that the cost is not solely borne
by firms. At the same time, the GoB needs to invest in higher-level technology and
training to improve worker productivity and increase skills used in higher-valued
manufactures. In the long-run, this would yield higher profits to the firms by opening new
markets and reducing dependence on low-end manufactures.
In terms of forward linkages, Bangladesh will have to improve the distribution
and marketing of its products. Assessments by The World Bank (2005) and IMF (2007)
have put forward several options. Feasible solutions include a research center to
encourage product and market diversification, image and brand building and human
resource development. However, Bangladesh will be largely limited in this regard until it
can produce the necessary backward linkages that could give way to spillover effects in
the RMG industry. A step in this direction would require infrastructure improvements in
ports, roads, railways and energy plants to reduce transportation costs and again, greater
training at the national and firm level. However, now in a quota-free system and with
slowing export revenues, Bangladesh has less support with which to make these
improvements.
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Shallow Financial System
Development of these linkages will not be possible without greater resource
mobilization. The Great Recession did not heavily affect the Bangladeshi financial sector,
but it did magnify the inefficiency of the sector and lack of adequate resources at the
country’s disposal. This has led to poorer asset quality, high costs and mismanagement,
all of which increase economic vulnerability. Failure to address these weaknesses will
likely continue to discourage domestic and international investor confidence, delay
critical technological and infrastructure upgrades for diversification and place undue
financial burden on the state.
As already seen, Bangladesh’s banks must improve their internal organization to
strengthen loan risk classification beforehand and loan recovery processes afterward.
This is especially important in SCBs, which have a higher number of NPLs115. This is
challenging given the entwined conflict of interests of these banks: the government is
their biggest borrower. The country has made some improvements in this area by hiring
more workers to help recover loans, enforcing regulations and using credit bureaus while
also working to develop the capital market and increase competition among banks to
increase consumer choice116. However, more is needed to increase investor confidence.
Additionally, the number of foreign banks remains limited in the country; more foreign
banks could increase competition and improve efficiency. Bangladesh, however, must be
careful that the spillovers of foreign banks are captured and that domestic banks are
“crowded in” rather than “crowded out.”
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The crisis also demonstrated that traditional market movements do not determine
Bangladesh’s interest rate and reemphasized those factors that do. It should reflect the
additional cost and risk of lending to banks but as demonstrated, interest rates are not
highly correlated to market deposit share. This indicates that other factors (social and
political) are in play to determine why some banks have larger deposits than others. The
BB and individual state and private banks could reduce the spread by improving
regulatory mechanisms to gather adequate information and screen borrowers. Banks
could also improve liquidity measurement tools to lower perceived illiquidity risks.
Institutional efficiency should also be strengthened, especially among domestic public
banks, to encourage competition and convergence on the interest rate. Again, more
private and/or foreign banks may help. However, monetary tools alone seem unlikely to
solve this problem. Instead, it will require a joint effort among several stakeholders to
reduce costs, risks and social patterns to incentivize lower rates.
Next, the crisis showed that Bangladesh’s high reliance on bank financing has
perpetuated the underdevelopment of its capital market. As it stands, foreign portfolio
investment only accounts for 2 percent of market capitalization. This has reduced risks of
capital flight but also hindered long-term lending needed for extensive development
projects that require more time to yield returns. It has also put it further behind its
international competitors: Bangladesh has the lowest ratio of stock market capitalization
to GDP among South Asian countries including its competitors India, Sri Lanka and
Pakistan117. The increased liquidity in other countries may mobilize financial resources
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quicker and encourage long-duration projects given that shares can be sold for money.
Also, without this development, public and private institutions have had to remain
dependent on other costly, short-term financial sources.
Last, the financial crisis did not spur a significant decrease in FDI in Bangladesh.
This was because FDI has remained extremely small (0.92% of GDP). Moreover, the
connection between FDI and GDP growth through technology transfer remains weak
with little evidence indicating that Bangladesh has been able to use FDI to yield industrywide improvements. The World Bank (2005) found that FDI has largely only benefited
foreign firms as part of the EPZ. If Bangladesh hopes to attract more and better utilize
FDI, it will need to address the issues that have discouraged FDI: barriers that have
limited the capacity of other sectors and narrowed investment opportunities. Without
these improvements, Bangladesh will find it difficult to attract further FDI. Meanwhile,
its competitors are seeing greater inflows of FDI118.
To encourage the capital market development, Bangladesh has made some strides
by committing to a series of sequencing reforms laid out in its Financial Sector
Development Plan (FSDP) in the next decade. However, its success will depend on its
ability to absorb the reforms accordingly. As demonstrated in other countries, financial
liberalization without adequate regulation and capacity increases risk that makes them
especially vulnerable to host-country shocks and capital flight in times of global
economic decline119. Bangladesh, unlike Zambia, has largely not yet faced this problem
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but could in the future, given increasing international economic and financial
competition.
Conclusions
In summary, it is clear the Great Recession affected Bangladesh, despite it being a
relatively insulated LIC. The severity of the crisis linked to the vulnerabilities of its
economic structure that had evolved throughout its economic history. Trade became the
primary transmission channel due to its large dependence on RMG exports (75%) to
advanced countries. Bangladesh first maintained export growth but low aggregate
demand eventually led to a fall in RMG exports. This contributed to a deterioration in
annual growth of total exports: a .10 percent change in 2010 versus 11.3 percent in 2009.
Growth in the volume imports also fell: to 9.6 percent in 2010 from 21.4 percent in 2009,
largely in capital machinery, food, and other inputs needed for garment production. The
decline in trade flows resulted in a deterioration in the BoP from $3.3 billion in 2009 to
$2.3 billion in 2010, or 4.2 percent to 3.7 percent of GDP. This occurred largely as
imports (i.e. RMG inputs) were reduced while export growth remained stagnant.
Nevertheless, the BB took considerable efforts to stabilize its currency using
stored reserves and had marginal appreciation against the dollar. Formal unemployment
declined slightly, 0.1 percent, but could fall further as labor supply is expected to
outweigh job creation. As trade flows fell, government revenues as a percentage of GDP
declined .5 percent from 2008 to 2009 and stagnated in 2010. Net lending/borrowing as a
percentage of GDP declined 1.7 percent further from 2008-2009. Combined with fewer
financial flows, this could strain government budgets and threaten development
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initiatives. Meanwhile, while not explored, global food prices have risen in Bangladesh
and could further exacerbate the situation120
In contrast, financial transmission had far less effect on Bangladesh. This
reflected its shallow financial system, highly centralized and dependent on the banking
sector with large levels of state control and little capital development. The most
noticeable effects from the crisis were then in an increase in the number of NPLs and a
slight decline in the growth of lending. The interest rate declined only marginally, given
the other factors that were controlling it. FDI also declined, falling from $300 million in
2009 or 1.3 percent of GDP in 2008 to .7 percent in 2009. Portfolio investment also fell
by $159 million in 2009 but remained too small to spur negative effects. Meanwhile,
ODA and remittances grew at a slower rate of growth.
Given these areas of impact, Bangladesh did not deeply suffer the crisis to the
extent many had predicted: GDP contracted .04 percent in 2009 from the year before.
However, GDP growth is not expected to improve significantly (.1 to .2% from 20112013)121 given the sluggish but competitive environment in which it now finds itself and
the key economic vulnerabilities that persist. Long-term implications from the crisis may
then still emerge. Larger future growth will greatly depend upon its ability to make
improvements in these areas. Suggestions have been put forward with a focus on
technological, educational and financial improvements, but all require a stronger
institutional framework. This is a challenge in itself and calls for further international
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assistance. In the meantime, Bangladesh seems unlikely to weather another global crisis
as smoothly.
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CHAPTER THREE: ZAMBIA CASE STUDY
Quick Impact but Stronger Recovery
Following the emergence of the crisis, the World Bank (2009) also categorized
the Sub-Saharan African country of Zambia as highly exposed to the transmission effects.
Economists predicted GDP growth would fall and, development accomplishments to date
could be significantly undermined in the country of 13 million people122. In the short-run,
the LIC did see its trade flows decline, its currency depreciate, unemployment rise and
government revenues decrease as a result of the crisis from 2008-2010. Zambia’s
financial sector, while shallow, also saw quick declines in its financial flows. These
effects were quicker and more severe than in many other LICs, including Bangladesh.
This in turn is linked to Zambia’s economic and financial weaknesses and has reemphasized the challenges it faces. In the long run, the remaining effects are still to be
seen.
In the same manner as the previous case study, this chapter explores how the
Great Recession impacted the LIC through the trade transmission with effects on exports
and imports and subsequently the exchange rate, unemployment and government
revenues. It then examines how Zambia’s structural vulnerabilities contributed to the
reach and depth of the transmission mechanism. Afterword, it examines how the financial
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transmission affected Zambia as a result of its initial shallow but unregulated financial
system. Similarities with Bangladesh exist but specific differences emerge, and these are
discussed appropriately. It concludes with recommendations to address these
vulnerabilities.
The Great Recession and its Trade Transmission (2008-2010)
In early 2008, Zambia was the world’s eighth largest producer of copper, and the
second largest copper exporter, mainly servicing buyers in China and European and other
African countries. Mining, largely of copper and cobalt, comprised only 8.4 percent of
total GDP123 ($15.2 billion) but almost 80 percent of export revenues. The remaining 20
percent of its exports included tobacco, flowers, cotton, and electricity. Imports included
machinery (i.e. boilers and nuclear reactors) food, oil, vehicles, and electrical equipment.
Increased deregulation and foreign investment helped result in a threefold Zambia’s GDP
from 2000 to 2008 (Figure 12 and Figure 13), with 75.6 percent trade openness.
Figure 12: Zambia’s GDP, in constant national prices,
US billions (1995‐2011)

Figure 13: Zambia GDP Growth, in constant prices as a
percentage (1995‐2011)
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Mining of copper has been both an impetus and barrier to economic growth and
stability in Zambia. High copper prices have served as an economic incentive to attract
123

The services sector was the largest contributor to GDP at 66 percent, followed by the agricultural sector and manufacturing
sector.
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investment and fuel production. Low copper prices have reduced profitability,
production and exports, forcing mines to close and reducing government revenues. This
has led to unemployment and declining incomes that have exacerbated
underdevelopment. This cycle would be repeated in 2008; in line with other LICs, the
crisis’ trade transmission was the primary contagion carrier with noticeable declines in
exports and imports, and subsequent impacts on the currency, labor market and
government revenues. However, the timing and severity of the crisis in Zambia varied
from other LICs, including Bangladesh.
To begin, the quantity demanded and price of copper are largely determined by
copper’s use as a production input in other industrial processes: copper is used heavily in
building and construction and as a component in many car parts. Thus, trade flows
became the primary channel as the recession induced a sharp reduction in the aggregate
demand for copper. This was aided by the large decline in residential and commercial
construction and the fall in the real estate market in advanced countries. Dependent
largely on the metal, the price decline on the world market then quickly transferred
negative effects to the Zambian economy.
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Figure 14: Copper Price, in USD per metric ton (Jan. 2008‐
Nov. 2009)
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Figure 15: Crude Oil Price, in USD per barrel (Jan.
2008‐Nov. 2009)
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Figure 14 shows the decline in the world price of copper in 2008. At its lowest, it
dropped 64 percent from its highest point in the year. Copper prices also followed the
drop in crude oil, a critical input in mining (Figure 15). The price fall led to an immediate
decline in copper exports and production (Figure 16); exports dropped 58.5 percent from
March 2008 to March 2009, or $244 million. Imports closely followed the export fall
(Figure 16), dropping 46.8 percent from April 2008 to April 2009, or $246 million, due to
a decline in production, real GDP, currency depreciation and incomes. Combined, this led
to a further deterioration in its BoP from $-0.7 billion in 2007 to $-1 billion in 2008
(Figure 17).

57

Figure 16: Zambian Exports and Imports, in US Millions (Jan.
2008‐Nov. 2009)

Figure 17: Zambia's Balance of Payments, in US Billions
(2006‐2011)
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Given that its exchange rate is positively correlated to the price of copper, the fall
in price and trade led to currency depreciation as the demand for the Zambian kwacha
fell. The kwacha, depreciated 50 percent relative to the US dollar in 2008124. Like
Bangladesh, Zambia relied on stored foreign exchange reserves to help cushion its fall,
but in doing so, drew down its stored resources. As a result, net reserves fell further:
roughly -1 billion in 2009 from -18 million in 2008125. In theory, the currency
depreciation could have created a demand incentive for other exports, but these areas had
limited capacity, discussed below, that prevented a shift from one sector to the next. Also,
the currency depreciation made physical capital imports for development more
expensive, including machinery and electrical equipment. This led to a deterioration of its
terms of trade by 45 percent from March-November 2008126.
While the recession impacted Zambia much sooner and deeper than Bangladesh,
Zambia also recovered quicker. As the price of copper rose in 2009, so did production
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and exports. The price of copper bottomed at $1,806/ton in 2008 but resurged to
$5,150/ton in 2009 and $7,535/ton in 2010127. Thus, exports rose back up to $418 million
in September 2009, 48 percent from its lowest point in the year just seven months earlier.
Imports also recovered, rising 30 percent in September 2009 from their lowest point in
the year. This resulted in a surplus in its BoP from $-1 billion in 2008 to $.5 billion
surplus in 2009 (Figure 17). This rebound was largely due to the composition of its
demand and trading partners, mostly other African developing countries and China; the
U.S. accounts for only 0.1 percent of Zambia’s exports. China continued largely as a
consistent buyer and investor, helping to raise the price of copper. Copper’s flexile use as
an input in other industrial sectors also restored its demand. In Bangladesh, slow
economic growth in Western markets continued longer keeping export demand low, and
competition was steeper with China and India as serious competitors.
Despite a quicker recovery, the transmission had subsequent impacts on the
Zambian labor market. Mining is primarily capital, rather than labor intensive, reducing
the potential effect by reducing the employment multiplier. Nevertheless, copper
producers stopped production when prices and demand fell128, reducing the number of
official jobs in the mining sector by 27 percent, or 8,100 jobs, in FY2008129. A decline in
the formal labor market also had direct impacts on other sectors dependent on miningrelated activities, as drilling and construction are contracted out and not considered in the
estimated official jobs of the sector. The informal labor market, 84 percent of the
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population, also likely saw negative impacts130. In Bangladesh, but not true in Zambia,
garment exports (and low-end manufactures in general) could sustain jobs longer through
wage cuts and other cost cutting techniques. In contrast, capital-intensive mining did not
utilize the same cost-cutting techniques as long, and the structure of the work relied
heavier on contractors it could not control. To date, some of these jobs have been restored
but not entirely.
Last, the decline in trade flows had important fiscal effects on the Republic of
Zambia (RoZ). Government revenues and expenditures also have historically followed
copper price trends, decreasing during low global prices and rising with higher prices. As
will be discussed, Zambia has not successfully adopted countercyclical policies in periods
of economic decline or expanded its revenue sources. This trait, explored further below,
is common of the “natural resource curse theory” (Ranis, 1981) in which volatile
revenues encourage governments to spend when money is readily available rather than
making wise, long-term sustainable budget decisions131. The Great Recession
reemphasized this dilemma: revenues as a percentage of GDP dropped almost 24 percent
from 2006 to 2009 as mining taxes declined and incomes fell while a poor tax structure
remained (Figure 18). Meanwhile, government expenditures shifted upward further
covered by debt (Figure 19). Net lending/borrowing to GDP increased 1.7 percent.
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Figure 18: Zambian Government Revenues and
Spending, as a percentage of GDP (2000‐2010)

Figure 19: Zambian Government Net lending/borrowing,
as a percentage of GDP (2000‐2010)
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On Figure 18 note that Zambia received significant debt relief assistance under the HIPC and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative,
completed in 2005 and 2006, helping to ease government debt.

Thus, the trade transmission had several immediate economic impacts on Zambia.
A decline in world copper prices caused export and import declines that resulted in
currency depreciation, unemployment and underemployment, and reduced government
revenues, all of which could threaten long-term development goals. This largely resulted
from its comparative advantage in mining that encouraged high export concentration
dependent on volatile world prices. Its dependence on copper also led to a quicker
recovery in both exports and imports. The impacts to Zambia from the crisis were not
surprising. Instead, they link to its structural economic weaknesses, explored below in
two periods: independence to 1991 and 1991 to 2008.
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Transmission Linked to Structural Vulnerability (1964-2008)
First Period (1964-1991)
Zambia’s history demonstrates the evolution of its export concentration that has
brought unbalanced growth and economic vulnerability seen again during the Great
Recession. Geographic luck and early mineral exploration in the late 1800s created a
wealth of mineral reserves, but these resource rents largely accrued to foreign investors.
It received its independence in 1964 as a former British protectorate. Like Bangladesh,
the new government lacked the local human, political or monetary capacity at its
independence to manage the industry alone and continued to rely heavily on foreign
assistance.
The new republic’s first president implemented a socialist economic policy
focused on central planning and nationalization to regain control of the mining industry.
Economic reforms in 1968 allowed the RoZ to claim large equity holdings in several
foreign-owned mining companies, creating two national firms. In 1971, the RoZ created
the state-run Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation with the country’s president as
board chairperson. Like in Bangladesh, state management could have nurtured the
industry, as mineral rents accounted for 40 percent of fiscal revenues132. In actuality, the
RoZ largely failed to establish and invest in sustainable funds or projects, discussed
below. In the short-run, the Post-War boom kept copper prices high and fueled narrow
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export growth. Copper exports then reached 95 percent of total export earnings and
spurred GDP growth, averaging 6.1 percent annually from 1964-1974133.
An increase in the world price of oil in the early 1970s resulted in a drop in the
price of copper. Zambia quickly faced a balance-of-payments crisis as export earnings
declined. The government responded by creating the Zambian Consolidated Copper
Mines (ZCCM) Limited by merging two state mines, but it soon had financial and
management problems as the government largely used it as a funding source. A lack in
further exploration and infrastructure coupled with instable political conditions also
increased risk, raised production costs and detoured investment. When the price of copper
did not improve and the losses became too great, the RoZ adopted strict SAPs from the
IMF that recommended trade and financial liberalization and the removal of the
government in the mining sector. Like in Bangladesh, the adjustment period did not give
domestic industries the time or capacity to adapt; as a result, the reforms largely failed.
By the 1985, copper production had fallen -20.5 percent134.
Several observations from this early period underscore the creation of the
vulnerabilities highlighted in the 2008 crisis. First, Zambia’s geographic and colonial
history helped create a comparative advantage in an abundant mineral. However, unlike
with garments, copper’s price has been historically volatile, a statistical “random walk”
characterized by up and down swings from varying demand and strict supplies limited by
the nature of mineral production. This includes available ore grades, transport, energy
and water. From this resource endowment, the country quickly became accustomed to
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periods of economic boom and bust paired with a lack of institutional and monetary
resources. This made the RoZ largely reactionary and its policies procyclical in this early
period. As Adam and Simpasa (2009, p. 14) wrote, it treated the “temporary positive
shock as it was permanent and the negative shock as if it was temporary.”
In this way, Zambia’s export concentration exhibited the “natural resource curse”
in which abundant natural resources yield high lucrative rents that often accrue unequally
and deflect difficult policy decisions. In this way, a country can easily continue “on its
old tracks” (Ranis, 1981, p. 215), encouraging economic stagnation or decline.
Additionally, in many cases, efforts to capture rents lead to corruption and political strife
which cause further economic distress. Sachs and Warner (1995), in their study of
resource-abundant natural countries, found a significant negative correlation between
resource intensity and GDP growth, arguing that these countries would have slower
and/or poorer economic and political development.
Zambia has been routinely cited as an example of this curse. The RoZ reaped the
benefits of high levels of investment, production and exports during high prices but
lacked the incentive and/or ability to invest mineral rents resourcefully or to store
emergency funds. As a result, GDP growth fluctuated widely: -2.9 percent in 1982; 9.27
percent in 1998; 2 percent in 1992; -13.4 in 1994135. To cope with poor prices, the RoZ
did not reduce spending (expenditures as a percentage of GDP doubled from 1970 to
1991136) and increased its debt to cover fiscal gaps. Meanwhile, mismanagement
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increased. In this way, the curse kept export growth significantly concentrated in mining
and away from sectors that could have reduced economic vulnerability.
Additionally, export concentration in this period made Zambia’s exchange rate
dependent on the price of copper, creating a trade vulnerability that resurfaced in 2008.
Illustratively, the kwacha fell 57.3 percent in value from 1981 to 1988 as the price of
copper rose from $1.52/lb to $2.09/lb137. Both a contributor and consequence of the
natural resource curse, the “Dutch Disease” theory holds that large inflows of foreign
exchange from exports lead to an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate and increase
inflationary pressures (Sachs and Warner, 1995). During low prices, a decrease in
exchange reserves often increases deficits and borrowing. Over time, the appreciation of
the nominal exchange rate creates an incentive to move capital resources away from less
profitable, non-resource sectors. Unfortunately, these other sectors may offer greater
opportunities for positive externalities (i.e. technology) needed for economic
diversification. In the case of Zambia, it became reliant on its international reserves, also
highly dependent on copper revenues, and quickly depleted them during periods of
economic decline. In the long run, critical capital and physical resources moved toward
the profitable mining sector.
Thus, the country soon exhibited a combination of the natural resource curse and
the Dutch Disease, coupled with high poverty and a lack of institutional and monetary
resources. Growth remained concentrated in primary mineral exports where the
opportunities and incentives for division of labor, higher technology and ultimately, a
higher standard of living remained low. Disequilibrium then could not give way to
137
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“complimentary” situations in which induced investment created from the mining
industry lead to stronger economic linkages and/or spillovers; both the supply and
demand impetuses were too small given the market and nonmarket forces working
against the LIC (Hirschman, 1958, p. 71-72; 100). Instead, its terms of trade continued to
weaken (Figure 20), as the price of manufactured imports rose relative to the price of its
primary exports.
Figure 20: Zambia's Net Barter Terms of Trade, 2000=100 (1980‐2009)
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Source: Constructed from World Bank, World dataBank (2011)

Second Period (1991-2008)
Zambia’s one-party ruler left office in 1991 following a monumental election that
ushered in a multi-party system. Facing huge economic losses and declining growth, the
new government again adopted SAPs to restore macroeconomic stability and facilitate
trade and financial sector growth, discussed below. It limited state control of prices, trade
restrictions and foreign currency transactions. But by 2000, the price of copper had fallen
almost 50 percent from 1995. Copper demand shifted to countries perceived as more
stable and efficient. Illustratively, while Zambia averaged a depressing -5 percent average
annual production growth rate, Chilean copper production averaged 11 percent annual
growth, fueled by lower-cost incentives, heavy foreign investments and a favorable
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political climate138. In Zambia, debt amassed as GDP and revenues declined and reached
over 200 percent as a percentage in 2001 and 2002139.
Zambia received debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative in 2000 in exchange for strict macroeconomic reforms that further privatized
the industry. It adhered, and by 2005 the country had $7 billion forgiven and had only
$500 million in external debt140. Better macroeconomic conditions coupled with high
world copper prices and rising demand encouraged new investment. The purchase of the
country’s largest copper producer in 2004 by an Indian company provided capital
resources to upgrade and expand mines, and processing plants. Meanwhile, reduced
regulation encouraged Austrian, Canadian and Chinese investment along its mining belt,
and the Chinese-Zambian economic partnership zone was created in 2007. By 2008,
Zambia had regained its status as a top copper exporter.
Two main conclusions from this period contributed to Zambia’s economic
vulnerability during the Great Recession: first, investment in this period largely now
came from large emerging markets including China and India. With little concern for
local growth, they responded to high copper prices, high aggregate demand, and a
reduced regulatory environment. On one hand, this brought critical capital that aided its
economic recovery in 2004 and again in the Great Recession. On the other hand, there
was now little ability to keep this capital in the country; instead, private foreign actors
had plenty of self-seeking motives to move flows in and out of the mining industry,

138

Meller (2011): 15.

139

IMF, WEO Database (September 2011)

140

As will be seen, its debt began to quickly rise again.

67

discussed further below. Moreover, they had even fewer incentives to make overarching
changes that benefited other parts of the economy.
Second, but in tandem, this period resulted in the almost complete removal of the
RoZ from the mining industry and a decline in the amount of mining taxes. The state
demonstrated fewer characteristics of the natural resource curse of the prior period but
now had far less political or economic capacity to mobilize and utilize resource rents.
Together, this too limited the ability to improve linkages, technology and training as
discussed in Chapter One. Instead, exports remained concentrated, accounting for
roughly 75 percent of total export earnings and encouraged further dependence on prices.
As shown, the once world copper prices fell, the trade transmission hit Zambia severely,
magnified by these deep-rooted economic problems. Moving forward, these challenges
remain, discussed below.
The Great Recession and the Financial Transmission (2008-2010)
At the outset of the crisis, Zambia’s had a relatively centralized and shallow
financial sector. It did not participate in off-balance sheet activities or invest in illiquid
securitized assets. By 2008, its financial sector was stable in comparison to prior decades
of instability and bank failures. Banks were largely foreign-owned141 but adequately
capitalized. Portfolio investment had grown but still remained only .5 percent of GDP in
2007. This was concentrated in a select group of mining companies on the Lusaka Stock
Exchange (LuSE), the majority of shares foreign-owned. FDI remained positively
correlated with copper prices and had risen on average 7.4 percent of GDP from 2002-
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2007 and reached 11.43 percent in 2007142. Nevertheless, its level of financial integration
increased its transmission risk. These shocks were again deeper than in Bangladesh and
largely attributable to foreign, unregulated integration established beforehand.
Notably, examining the data from 2008-2010, the global credit crunch in
advanced countries transmitted perceived risk and illiquidity to Africa. Commercial
banks’ nominal and real interest rates rose, and asset quality deteriorated. In 2009, the
number of NPLs increased to 12.6 percent from 7.2 percent from 2008143. This reduced
banks’ return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA), and banks’ profits fell144.
Illiquidity and poor asset quality drove up the lending rate, rising 4.9 percent from
November 2008, peaking at 23.1 percent in November 2009 (Figure 21). As a result,
domestic banking credit as a percentage of GDP fell .3 percent and credit to the private
sector fell 2.9 percent in 2009145. The remaining recorded growth was due to credit
expansion to the government while the proportion of credit to public and private
enterprises, households and non-bank financial institutions all fell.
Figure 21: Zambia's Interest Rate (2007‐2009)
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International bank lending also fell as foreign parent banks from other African
countries and the UK also faced the credit crunch. It is estimated foreign assets fell 28.5
percent from May 2008 to August 2009146. This was partially due to the Bank of Zambia
(BoZ) restricting short-term foreign bank lending to no less than one year to avoid further
transmission. This minimized further problems and subsequent large credit reductions
were not recorded. In some cases, foreign banks injected capital into subsidiary banks to
increase liquidity. The BoZ also utilized expansionary monetary policies to maintain
stability. As a result, only one of 16 banks rated unsatisfactory in terms of capital
adequacy, asset quality, earnings and liquidity in 2009147. Trade credit is largely still
developing in Zambia and has not been reported separately from the overall decrease in
lending.
Zambia saw greater effects in its capital markets, as a result of capital flight.
Foreign investors sold their assets due to plummeting copper prices, the depreciating
currency and decreased confidence. The LIC recorded -74.9 million in net portfolio
investment in 2008, or -5 percent of GDP, from -6 million in 2007148. The all-share index
declined significantly in 2008 as foreign investors sold their shares, facing their own
financial troubles at home. As a result, capital flight by way of the financial transmission
caused the all-share index to decline by an average of 5 percent monthly from March to
December 2008149. The volume of shares traded registered 203.5 million in 2009, the
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lowest recorded since 2002150. Portfolio investment has since recovered with rising
copper prices (73.6 million in 2010), again demonstrating the volatile nature of the flow.
FDI also fell as investors reversed their inflows. Zambia registered a 29 percent
drop in inflows in 2008 as investors faced constrained markets and increased risk (Figure
22). Net flows fell from 11.4 percent of GDP to 6.3 in the same period151. The amount of
pledged investment also dropped significantly (80%) in 2009 compared to 2008152.
Again, these effects were much greater than in Bangladesh. Discussed below, the reversal
in investment flows during the financial crisis largely resulted from Zambia’s initial
unregulated financial sector. High copper prices led to a return of higher portfolio and
FDI investment in 2010, led by Chinese and Indian investors. As a result, FDI registered
6.8 percent of GDP in 2010 and is expected to be higher in 2011 but still below pre-crisis
levels153.
Figure 22: FDI Inflows to Zambia, US Millions (1990‐2009)
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Briefly, in other financial flows the most noticeable impacts have been in
increased foreign debt. Zambia received increased monetary assistance from the IMF as a
result of the crisis, increasing its SDRs from 62 million in 2009 to 256.1 million in 2010.
With this funding, the BoZ borrowed $344.7 million from the IMF in 2009, a 70 percent
increase from 2008154. This increased its external debt which reached $1.2 billion in
2010, rising 140 percent from where it stood in 2005 after the completion of the HIPC
debt program. Zambia is clearly not moving away from international debt as a funding
tool, especially in hard times. Additionally, the African Development Bank (AfDB) went
forward with two large loans to the LIC: $24 million in 2010 and $48 million in 2011 to
help fund poverty reduction programs.
Meanwhile, ODA remained stable, hovering around $700 million from 20072009155. While it has not fallen significantly, it has also not increased to meet additional
development needs presented by the trade and financial transmissions. Increased loans
are likely being used to help address this gap. Remittances meanwhile have remained
stable: they continued to rise but at a slower rate (they remained at $68 million in 2008
and 2009 and increased slightly to $71 million in 2010)156.
Financial Transmission Linked to Structural Vulnerability
Similar to the trade transmission, the financial transmission only re-emphasized
the structural weaknesses in the Zambian financial sector. Beginning in the late 1980s,
with the adoption of SAPs and into the early 1990s with the change in government,
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Zambia’s banking sector underwent significant deregulation and privatization. It removed
interest rate and other lending controls. The 1994 Bank and Financial Services Act
increased capitalization standards and allowed banks to accept foreign currency deposits
in 1995. As a result, many largely foreign, privately owned banks and other financial
institutions—backed by foreign parent institutions—opened. This process occurred much
faster than in Bangladesh where financial development was more moderate and
controlled157. Perhaps because of this quick transition, the BoZ largely did or could not
adequately strengthen or support its domestic banks, and three commercial banks
collapsed from 1994-1998 and four more collapsed by 2005158. This moved the sector
further toward foreign ownership; by 2008, foreign-owned commercial banks held 65.8
percent of deposits while domestic commercial banks held only 21 percent of deposits. In
other LICs, this rate remained much lower, only 7 percent in Bangladesh for example.
The long-term impact of foreign-owned banks to the domestic financial sector in
LICs has been debated. In some cases, they can help a country achieve and maintain
macroeconomic stability and efficiency. In Zambia, the parent-subsidiary relationship did
have subsequent contagion effects but also helped ease illiquidity during the Great
Recession. However, many of the “parents” were in other African countries that followed
similar economic trends and were not involved in complex financial products. The BoZ
increased loan maturities to avoid contagion but this may not have worked if the shock to
the home country had been greater and/or their own financial integration had been larger.
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In a future scenario then, this could still easily expose Zambia to home-country economic
shocks (Stiglitz, 2010).
Additionally, the spillover effects of foreign-owned banks, i.e., technology and
training, remained small. Foreign banks appear to have contributed to greater lending by
increased competition, but problems with financial inclusion, legal rights and regulations,
infrastructure and technical expertise throughout the industry remained. These problems
were larger and more noticeable in domestic institutions, moving deposits to foreign
banks and putting domestic players at a further disadvantage. This follows Hermes and
Lensink (2004) who found in their study of 48 countries that for the benefits of foreign
banks to outweigh the costs to domestic banks, an initial level of higher financial
development is needed. The Great Recession again demonstrated this disfavor as
domestic banks, characterized by initial poorer asset quality, saw a greater impact159.
Thus, foreign banks may have been crowding out domestic banks, which had not had the
time or tools to adapt accordingly.
Downward movements in portfolio investment and FDI also reflected the
structural weaknesses of Zambia’s financial system. In 2004, the Private Sector
Development Reform Program sought to encourage economic, e.g. infrastructure,
improvements through private investment with revisions to the investment code and
regulatory framework. The reforms allowed 100 percent repatriation of profits, free entry
of investment in all sectors, trade reforms to harmonize the tariff structure, and the
removal of quota restrictions. As a result, foreign flows increased160 but remained
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concentrated in a handful of foreign mining companies, where the profit incentive was
greater. Inflows also became positively correlated with the price of copper, following
volatile changes. High prices in the past decade helped these flows grow significantly in
the years prior to the crisis, and FDI recorded an all-time high in 2007 at $1.3 billion. The
Chinese largely fueled this growth, accounting for roughly of 12 percent of total inflows
for the year161.
Two large concerns arise from the unregulated increase in FDI and private
portfolio flows. First, global financial integration can cause financial resources to flow
outward in periods of economic decline in the global system or in the domestic (both the
host and home country) system. The reversal of these inflows can cause further
macroeconomic distress in the host country by exacerbating the existing macroeconomic
weaknesses (Chang and Grabel, 2004). This is more probable if adequate regulation
mechanisms are absent or limited. So-called “circuit breakers” or “rule(s) that limits the
transfer of funds in and out of a country under certain circumstances” (Stiglitz, 2010, p.
391) were largely non-existent in Zambia. This was the result of deregulation and
privatization of the mining sector; policy makers viewed any controls as investment
deterrents. High prices have kept investment from China and India flowing and reduced
pressures to address this vulnerability. However, capital outflows—while brief—from the
Recession reemphasized this risk.
Second, there is concern that FDI has and will be effectively used in Zambia and
concern of its negative externalities. FDI and other private capital flows are minimally
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controlled or taxed, giving foreign investors large exemptions162 in exchange for capital
resources. Like in Bangladesh, the RoZ was then left with little decision-making ability
in its mining industry. Without domestic buy-in and proper regulation, FDI can cause
negative environmental, social and economic effects in resource-rich LICs (World Bank,
2003). In this “race to the bottom” phenomenon, unregulated foreign investors will
quickly and carelessly extract environmental and human resources, leaving little left for
the host country163. The resurge of Chinese investment has re-raised this issue in Zambia
as its investment has increased steadily while monitoring and transparency of the foreign
actor remain weak.
Moving Forward (2011 and Beyond)
Export Concentration and Associated Vulnerable Trade Characteristics
The Zambian case has demonstrated the perils of a resource-rich country,
booming in times of high prices with concentrated exports but contracting quickly in
times of economic decline. The Great Recession aggravated this structural vulnerability:
the decline in copper prices in 2009 from decreased aggregate demand caused copper
exports to fall quickly. As a result, imports also fell with subsequent negative effects on
its currency, labor market and government revenues. Thus, one of the greatest lessons is
the need for both improvements in efficiency of its primary export—copper—and
diversification of its exports.
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First, Zambia must improve its efficiency in mining to remain competitive. Like
Bangladesh, it needs to strengthen its production and distribution processes, or its
forward and backward linkages. This will require greater attention to its variable inputs
including labor, infrastructure, transport, energy, licensing and contracts. Its competition
has already done so: when once Chile and Zambia produced comparable outputs of
copper, Chile has surged ahead in the past two decades through these types of regulatory
and cost improvements164. Second, Zambia will need to make conscious efforts to
improve its export diversification. The copper industry offers several higher-valued
options into manufactures that use it as an input that could be made in-country. Other
export sectors with promise include food and beverage processing, construction, and the
manufacture of chemicals, textiles and fertilizer. The agriculture sector, comprised of
non-traditional exports of tobacco, flower and cotton, also offer opportunities.
This, however, will require directed efforts to work against the natural resource
curse, Dutch Disease and the race-to-the-bottom phenomenon. As it stands, Zambia is not
moving toward a policy of diversification: the percentage of non-traditional exports165
has declined despite the fact that these exports are less volatile. There are several
examples on how to overcome these development issues in resource-rich countries, and
while they cannot provide an exact recipe, they offer some important suggestions to
better harness and invest resource rents. In doing so, countries with abundant natural
resources are more likely to achieve higher growth rates (Sachs and Warner, 1995). One
idea is natural resource funds (NRFs), used in many mineral-rich countries including
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Chile and Botswana. Successful NRFs are countercyclical and increase macroeconomic
stabilization, assisting in budget financing and encouraging critical savings and
investment while reducing risk166. Botswana’s Sustainable Budget Index serves as a
mechanism in which mineral revenues fund development expenditures and recurrent
spending on education and health; non-mineral revenues cover other recurrent
expenditures167 (Iimi, 2007).
For Zambia to adopt an NRF, it would need to reconsider two things: foreign
ownership of mining and associated profits. Foreign ownership has upgraded mining
processes and reduced costs but its positive externalities have been limited. Mining
revenue as a portion of total government revenue has been traditionally very low (3%),
and privatization of the industry in 2002 has left the government with fewer fiscal tools.
In order for the country to benefit from the resource rents, taxation of foreign mining
operations must increase. Additionally, more government oversight is needed to increase
both the capacity and capability of other sectors to absorb these resources. The country
put forth a new tax regime in 2008 to increase the amount of revenues collected from
foreign mining operations, but its implementation has not been pursued with the same
vigor in the post-crisis environment, as competition for investment is stiffer.
Economic mechanisms alone, however, may not suffice: several political and
social variables are at work that must be overcome to use resources wiser. Among these,
Iimi (2007) in a study of 89 countries found that successful natural resource management
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relies on good governance. This includes strong voice and accountability, high
government effectiveness, anticorruption policies, and a consensus of the current level of
industry regulation. Thus, the above economic recommendations may prove especially
challenging considering that the RoZ has little political control of regulatory oversight of
mining activities, and its society has high inequality that has contributed to social unrest
and low government legitimacy. Moreover, Zambia’s citizens are divided on how to
regulate foreign investors, particularly Chinese interests. As Adam and Simpasa (2009)
wrote, the “right model for the equitable distribution of the rents” is Zambia’s “central
economic challenge now and in the future” (p. 49).
Shallow Financial System
As Zambia recovers, the crisis has offered several future lessons to mobilize and
strategically invest critical funds to implement the recommendations above. First, it reemphasized the need to strengthen its weak domestic banking sector. To do so, it must
address underlying problems of illiquidity, declining asset quality, and high capital costs.
These will require adequate infrastructure, technology and human capital as well as
adequate regulations and accountability. Zambia has put forth initiatives to reduce risk
including an overnight standing facility to ensure commercial banks’ access to liquidity;
improvements in the credit bureau; a framework for channeling long-term funds; deposit
protection scheme; and efforts to follow the Basel II Accord. The 2009-2012 Financial
Sector Development Plan continues with these initiatives. However, these market-based
financial reforms will require proper sequencing approaches with gradual changes to give
domestic banks time to adapt to new standards.
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Second, Zambia must increase financial inclusion, as the majority of its residents
do not use a formal financial product, further reducing the amount of savings and
loanable funds. As it stands now, the banking sector largely serves the government,
corporate sector and the upper working class. Reducing the high cost of capital may help
but the obstacles are also income-based: the most reported barriers include income and
the perceived view that an account is not needed (roughly 76 percent reported these were
the greatest barrier)168. Others include affordability, physical access, usage issues and
eligibility appropriateness. Thus, financial inclusion could help improve livelihoods,
further mobilizing savings. Namely, Zambia would be wise to extend financial services to
the agricultural sector, where a majority of the poorest people makes its livelihood with
non-traditional exports. This would also help food inflation, which is slowly rising169.
The RoZ has been less proactive than the GoB in this regard: food and agricultural
assistance programs have not been reportedly cut as a result of the crisis but have not
increased to match rising prices.
Third, the crisis has again shown the weakness of Zambia’s capital market.
Capital development depends on several factors, but improvements and diversification in
its export sector could increase the number of participants. Unlike Bangladesh, a high
level of participation of mineral companies offers an opportunity to increase financial
resources and innovation. The government is also taking more of a concerted effort and
has announced plans to sell government bonds on the international markets to raise
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capital for infrastructure. If successful, this could improve the country’s creditworthiness
and attract further investment. Other initiatives include encouraging corporations to use
the debt market, investment guidelines, issuance of longer-term government bonds, and
awareness campaigns of the stock exchange.
In doing so, however, the RoZ must be more cautious. As it stands, there are no
controls on the transfer of portfolio investment or FDI in or out of Zambia. The 2008
crisis served as another reminder of the problem of unregulated capital flows: their
reversal expanded the transmission by further reducing liquidity and investor confidence.
As financial flows rebound, Zambia will have to make regulatory changes to better
control the movement of financial flows in times of economic distress. Thus, it should
work now to institute appropriate “circuit breakers” (Stiglitz, 2010). This includes
improved legal and regulatory oversight that help the Zambian system detect, understand
and respond quicker to market movements and associated risks. A NRF could also help
by routinely setting aside certain funds that could not flow outward along with routine
transparency and reporting from foreign banks and investors.
Conclusions
The evidence demonstrates that the financial crisis did have a noticeable impact
on Zambia. This impact directly linked to the vulnerable structural features of its
economy, namely concentrated exports of a low-valued but volatile natural resource.
Additionally, its impact was deeper than in Bangladesh. The trade mechanism proved to
be the most severe transmission channel, given the LIC’s heavy dependence on copper
revenues. When copper prices fell, Zambia saw large declines in exports (roughly 58%)
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and imports (46%) over a year. The resurge of the price of copper helped Zambia recover
quickly and it registered impressive export growth in 2009. However, export growth grew
only .3 percent from 2009 to 2010, a sharp decline from 9 percent export growth in years
prior. Growth in imports also fell: -7.6 in 2009 from 8.9 percent in 2008, largely in
machinery, food, and oil. Overall, Zambia saw a deterioration in its balance of payments
from -.7 billion in 2007 to -1 billion in 2008 or -6.5% of GDP to -7.1 percent of GDP.
This has had subsequent effects on the currency (depreciated roughly 50 percent
against the dollar) and its formal and informal labor markets. The transmission spread
further by reducing government revenues: they fell almost 24 percent as a percentage of
GDP from 2008 to 2009 as mining taxes declined, incomes fell and a poor tax structure
remained. Meanwhile, public expenditures continued to shift upward, funded by
international borrowing. The net lending/borrowing ratio to GDP increased 1.7 percent
and has remained negative.
In contrast, the financial transmission had less effect than the trade transmission
but also directly linked to the sector’s structural vulnerabilities. While shallow with
limited resources, the Zambian case demonstrated the financial risks that come with even
smaller levels of integration. In the banking sector, the most noticeable effects were in an
increase in the NPLs, an increase in the interest rate (4.9%) and a reduction in lending
(domestic credit to the private sector to GDP fell 2.9 percent in 2009). In the capital
markets, FDI and portfolio flows declined due to capital flight as foreign investors
liquidated their assets due to poor economic conditions at home. Net portfolio investment
registered -74.9 million (0.5% of GDP). FDI inflows fell 5.09 percent of GDP in 2009
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from 2008, registering $650 million. Meanwhile, ODA declined slightly while
remittances remained strong.
Overall, Zambia’s GDP growth contracted .5 percent in 2008 from 2007 from the
international economic downturn170. Given its partnership with China and the rebound of
the price of copper on the world market, Zambia recovered much quicker than in
Bangladesh. It registered 7.6 percent growth in 2010, its highest recorded annual growth
rate ever171. It is expected to see steady annual growth in the years to come. However, its
structural weaknesses persist as world food and fuel prices rise and global economic
conditions remain uncertain. Given the unregulated economic and financial environment
Zambia has embraced, failure to implement better controls is likely to magnify the reach
and intensity of future global shocks.
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARISONS, CONCLUSIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
This project has demonstrated how LICs became susceptible to the Great
Recession through three main transmission channels: trade flows, rising food and fuel
prices, and financial flows. It then linked the severity of the transmission channels to key
structural vulnerabilities in LICs. This framework provided the background to examine
the crisis’ effect on two LICs, Bangladesh and Zambia, and the initial weaknesses that
made each more vulnerable. The main conclusions of these case studies are summarized
below along with considerations for other LICs embarking on trade and financial
liberalization in an increasingly globalized world.
The Trade Transmission: Conclusions and General Recommendations
It has been shown that while the trade mechanism reduced flows deeper in high
and middle-income countries, LICs also saw negative impacts as a result of decreased
aggregate demand. In both case studies, high export concentration (70-80%) in the
number of products and buyers increased the severity of the transmission. Bangladesh
was able to maintain high volumes of its RMG exports and as a result, saw less initial
impact. Meanwhile, Zambia saw immediate effects as the price of copper fell with a drop
in retail housing and commercial construction spurring a reduction in copper exports and
production. However, it also recovered sooner as the price of copper improved.
Meanwhile, Bangladesh continued to face slow economic growth.
Nevertheless, both countries experienced volatile movements in their trade flows
from 2008-2010. Zambia’s exports dropped roughly 59 percent from the lowest to the
highest point in a year while Bangladesh saw a 30 percent change. Zambia recovered in
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early 2009, but the downturn still resulted in only a small increase in total export growth.
The rate of export growth rose .3 percent, from 19.4 percent to 19.7 percent from 2009 to
2010. This small gain was significantly less than in years prior in which it recorded 8-9
percent gains. Bangladesh’s rate of export growth also slowed, rising only .1 percent in
2010 from 2009 (16.5 percent to 16.6 percent), a noticeable reversal from its strong gains
(10 percent annual growth) in the years prior to the crisis.
Both countries also saw a reduction in imports, largely of production inputs and
food, resulting from decreased output and higher prices. Currency depreciation in Zambia
also made imports more expensive, and it saw a roughly 47 percent drop in imports from
2008 to 2009 while Bangladesh saw a 22 percent decline. As result, Zambia’s import
growth fell -7.6 percent in 2009 from 8.91 percent in 2008 but rose again in 2010172.
Bangladesh’s imports increased only 9.6 percent in 2010, from 21 percent in 2009, and
slowed in 2011.
The combined effect has caused further deterioration in the BoP in both LICs but
for different reasons. The BoP fell to $2.3 billion in 2010 from $3.3 billion in 2009 in
Bangladesh, and to $-.1 billion in 2009 from $-.7 billion in 2008 in Zambia. The
difference between the two LICs reflects the overall economic environment faced by each
country as well as its unique economic structural conditions. In Zambia, its improvement
in copper exports, driven by Chinese investment, helped offset the effect of more
expensive imports. Meanwhile, the gap in Bangladesh was largely due to lower imports
from less RMG production for export.
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Downward movements in trade flows had subsequent effects in both LICs,
extending the transmission story to the micro level. As a result of decreased exports,
production fell in both countries. Neither reported large effects in the formal market but
underemployment increased in both LICs. Zambia appears to have seen a greater effect in
both its formal and informal labor markets. Bangladesh instead was able to use other
cost-cutting techniques common in low-end manufactures that again raised humanitarian
concerns. The decline in trade flows and household income also reduced government
revenues in both countries. This strained government budgets and increased net
borrowing/lending as a percentage of GDP by roughly the same amount

(-1.75%).

Coupled with rising prices, these effects then raised long-term development concerns at
the micro level.
In line with the framework presented in Chapter One, these impacts and their
severity fed off each country’s structural vulnerabilities. Both countries became more
susceptible to the trade transmission as a result of high export concentration in low-value,
low-technology primary commodities and manufactures that had little capacity to
improve efficiency and diversification into higher-value opportunities. Coupled with
trade liberalization in the past decade, a lack of adequate fiscal and monetary impetuses
perpetuated these problems and increased their risk.
Considerations for Other LICs
This project showed that export growth for many LICs is usually undiversified.
As discussed, this is an often unavoidable situation: their comparative advantage tends to
be in low-valued, low-tech exports with volatile prices that tend toward deteriorating
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terms of trade that puts them at a further disadvantage. Furthermore, this export
dependence brings increased vulnerability and risk in periods of lower demand, as they
have little ability to spread their risk among a variety of export sectors. Additionally,
unbalanced and unutilized growth tends to limit the resources applied to and capacity of
other sectors, further diminishing the opportunities for linkages and spillover effects
within an economy.
To overcome this process and diversify outward requires deliberate actions that
often counteract market forces; economic incentives must be created at both the firm and
national level where they currently do not exist or are too weak to adopt new training and
technology for greater export opportunities (Lall, 2000). This in turn requires effective
political, financial and human resources. This process is also not quick, as LICs often
internally lack these resources and capacity; therefore, policy sequencing and/or a type of
protection may be needed to give fledging industries time and ability to compete. Without
this nurturing, trade barriers alone may not produce the benefits needed to create
competitive industries, as seen primarily in Bangladesh.
Another applicable lesson is to not only diversify outward but to become more
competitive in the goods LICs are currently producing and exporting. In both case
studies, the LICs were losing part of their market share to international competitors who
made strategic investments earlier on. Critically, many of them had stronger institutions
and greater resources that reduced costs and improved efficiency for scalable growth.
However, LICs often lack many of these assets. Thus, when they seek to improve
production and distribution processes in their current exports, they must be especially
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careful of common negative externalities of economic efficiency that they may not be
able to control. The Recession has again demonstrated the effects of increased pressures
on LICs to reduce regulations and taxation to attract more buyers and sellers.
Unmanaged, this can lead to further resource degradation and underdevelopment.
With these goals in mind, LICs will also need to strengthen the link between their
manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Traditional wisdom has said to move resources
away from agriculture toward manufactures to avoid volatile, low prices and increase
opportunities for growth. However, the need to better utilize and further upgrade the
agricultural sector is becoming more apparent, especially as global food prices rise and
low-value manufactures demonstrate the same vulnerabilities as primary commodities.
Improving this link could reduce deteriorating terms of trade and its associated effects by
reducing import costs as well as providing export inputs. Additionally, technical
improvements in the agricultural sector would engage more of the LIC’s unskilled work
force in opportunities with greater division of labor and training. This will require
incentives in a sector that traditionally has had low profitability.
Several questions arise on who should be involved in this process. Both case
study countries went through two distinct periods: one with a high-level of state
involvement and the other without. Periods of state control in both LICs did not largely
produce the successful export-led management seen in other countries. In Bangladesh,
state control of the RMG industry quickly became corrupted and bankrupted the industry,
while state management in Zambia focused on short-term mining projects rather than
long-term development initiatives. On the other hand, privatization of industries removed
88

economic control almost entirely from the state and placed it in private hands. This
limited the amount of regulation and oversight that could be enforced, and the amount of
revenues that could be collected. This raised greater concern in Zambia where the
industry became largely foreign-owned whereas the industry remained largely
domestically-owned in Bangladesh. In both cases in both periods, economic
diversification remained limited while efficiency declined, reflecting the additional
internal deficiencies and external conditions faced by these LICs. Moving forward,
questions of foreign participation in lucrative industries are likely to become more
critical, especially in the rise of Chinese and Indian investment in LICs. Thus, LICs
should go slow and develop appropriate policies to utilize resource rents.
The Financial Transmission: Conclusions and General Recommendations
In contrast, the financial transmission had far less impact on LICs than the trade
mechanism. It also had less effect on LICs than MICs and HICs, given their limited
integration. However, the severity of the transmission varied among LICs according to
each country’s financial structure and associated weaknesses. From the case studies,
Zambia saw deeper impacts than Bangladesh. In banking and lending, both countries saw
the number of NPLs increase and a reduction in lending as liquidity dried up. However,
Bangladesh’s banking sector was controlled by domestic actors (93% deposit control)
while Zambia’s sector was controlled by foreign participants (65% deposit control). This
brought different challenges during the economic decline: Bangladesh’s problems
pertained to asset quality, transparency, and poor management while it better managed its
interest rate and liquidity. Meanwhile, Zambia’s problems dealt with direct market
89

changes as liquidity fell and its interest rate climbed 4.9 percent. Foreign participation
also threatened it with a decline in international bank lending. As a result, lending to the
domestic private sector fell in Zambia while only slowed down in Bangladesh173.
In the capital markets, portfolio investment remained small in both countries but
much higher in Zambia. Zambia saw an immediate effect in capital flight as foreign
investors liquidated their assets: it registered -74.9 million in portfolio investment in 2008
(0.6% of GDP) from -6 million the year prior. In comparison, Bangladesh registered 31.6
million in portfolio investment in 2009 (0.03% of GDP) but saw a decline of -612 million
in 2010 (0.6% of GDP) as its trade flows fell. FDI also remained small in both countries
but again was higher as a percentage of GDP in Zambia, where it was also unregulated174.
As a result, while both saw a drop in FDI around 30% over a year, it had a greater impact
in Zambia. However, Zambia has since seen larger growth in FDI while its growth in
Bangladesh remains minimal, likely given increased industry competition175. In other
flows, ODA and remittances remained relatively stable in both countries. Zambia, more
than Bangladesh, has increased its borrowing with the IMF and development banks,
largely due to greater immediate effects.
Like the trade transmission, the severity of the financial transmission linked to the
financial vulnerabilities in both countries. Shallow financial systems limited its effects
but did not isolate the LICs completely. Foreign actors in both the money and capital
markets increased financial integration and risk, further opening both countries to global
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shocks. This encouraged unregulated financial flows, especially in Zambia. This resulted
in quick capital movements in and out of the country, threatening macroeconomic
stability. Issues in the banking sector also resurfaced in both countries as a result of the
crisis including poor management, illiquidity, asset quality and high interest rates. Again,
asset ownership (domestic v. foreign) helped determine what problems were aggravated
more than others.
Considerations for other LICs
Throughout this project, it has been shown that LICs require more financial
resources but also better systems to mobilize them effectively. In general, many LICs
must strengthen their domestic banking sectors. The case studies demonstrated the
different problems associated with different frameworks. In Bangladesh, the sector
remained largely domestic-owned with high state involvement. This led to moderate
growth but high costs, corruption and low transparency. In the crisis, these weaknesses
resurfaced. Meanwhile, foreign banks largely controlled the sector in Zambia as a result
of rapid financial liberalization. They have increased competition and lowered borrowing
costs, but also pushed domestic banks out of the sector and generated few spillover
effects to the remaining domestic banks. They could also make Zambia vulnerable to
shocks in their own home countries in a future scenario. As LICs embrace financial
liberalization with more private and foreign actors, they will need to consider how this
composition affects the sector as a whole and adjust regulations appropriately.
Additionally, LICs need to better mobilize resources by increasing financial
access and products to other economic sectors and to those who remain under- or
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unbanked. In addition to bank reforms, this includes the need to further develop the
capital market for further financial development. As it stands now, it remains very limited
in LICs, despite growth in incomes, savings, and lower inflation and currency
stabilization. This underdevelopment can further hinder long-term public and private
credit needs and put individual LICs behind other emerging market competitors. Instead,
LICs should work with stakeholders to address the market and non-market barriers that
detour investment, including legal, political and social impediments. Many LICs have
begun to do so through national financial development plans but will require additional
support moving forward.
But as shown in this project, LICs must also better monitor and utilize the
resources they do have. Financial development in LICs often requires a system to
regulate and monitor resource allocations, namely those who will benefit. This is
especially critical in resource-rich countries like Zambia where lucrative resource rents
can discourage long-term, wise investments and lead to further economic and political
distress. Financial development also requires “circuit breakers” (Stiglitz, 2010) that limit
the movement of financial flows to prevent capital flight and subsequent domestic
instability. This also has been included in many national development policies but in
many cases, incentives to attract financial flows have outweighed the appropriate
regulation and oversight. Moving forward, as LICs become more integrated, they will
need to make more concerted efforts in this regard to protect themselves in periods of
economic decline.
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The above recommendations will require a larger institutional presence and
greater accountability from both domestic and international institutions. Governments
with a larger fiscal space generally have greater access to macroeconomic countercyclical
policies to help their citizens cope with negative external shocks. At the household level,
governments with pro-poor policies and/or assigned government funds can increase
public transfers and in-kind services to poor people to better protect them. Bangladesh,
more than Zambia, increased these types of programs while Zambia largely only
maintained current social programs. Moving forward, both of these governments and
many LICs will require better systems to appropriately manage their fiscal resources in
both good and bad times in order to see long-term development.
Conclusions and Future Questions
This project has served as an evaluation of the evidence to date. At the start of the
crisis, both countries had been categorized as highly exposed to the poverty effects of the
Great Recession (World Bank, 2009). The findings show that increased trade and
financial openness increased the contagion effects of the crisis and led to declining GDP
growth in both countries: 0.04 percent in Bangladesh and 0.5 percent in Zambia176.
However, in terms of lasting effects, at this point it is safer to say that the trade and
financial transmissions contributed to lower growth rates in both countries and, coupled
with other global factors, i.e. rising prices, debt crises, and increasing competition, they
could have long-term impacts at the macro and micro level.
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This was in the years they demonstrated the effects of the crisis: 2008 in Zambia and 2009 in Bangladesh (IMF, WEO Database
(September 2011)).
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That being said, both countries have seen economic recovery, aided by
international institutions including the IMF, ADB and AfDB and domestic governmental
programs. The IMF is also optimistic about their future: Bangladesh is expected to return
to and Zambia will surpass pre-crisis GDP growth levels in 2011177. Bangladesh, like the
rest of Asia, is expected to continue growing, but less quickly as external aggregate
demand from advanced countries remains lower. The internal vulnerabilities of
Bangladesh may also result in less growth than its neighbors. In contrast, Sub-Saharan
Africa has maintained high growth rates in spite of the continued global slowdown. If
copper prices and Chinese investment continue, growth is expected to remain quite high
in Zambia.
This has reduced concerns of the long-term impacts of the crisis but also raised
new questions. While optimistic, the IMF (WEO, September 2011) also warned against
the instability of the global system writing,
“Almost three years after the crisis, the global economy continues to be
challenged with intermittent volatility. Economic performance has become even
more bipolar in nature, with anemic growth in economies with large pre-crisis
imbalances and robust activity in many others” (p. 1).
Given this risk then, LICs with larger trade and financial openness and inherent
instabilities are not isolated and could see the severity and frequency of global shocks
rise.
Additionally, in evaluating these questions, several methodological issues remain.
First, it will be difficult to disaggregate the causes of any single phenomenon considering
the other simultaneous but intertwined macroeconomic shocks at work, i.e. food prices
177

IMF, "World Economic Outlook: Slowing Growth, Rising Risks." IMF Website. September 2011.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/pdf/text.pdf (accessed September 24, 2011).
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and debt crises. Second, it is challenging to get timely and accurate data from LICs to
compare them. Instead, much of the data from comes from anecdotal reports that do not
quantify the full effect. This is especially true at the micro level; thus, our understanding
of how the crisis has affected the poorest citizens may be too optimistic. Third, it is
difficult to fairly compare two countries with so many variables. By sheer economic
indicators, one could conclude Zambia fared worse than Bangladesh in the two years
studied. This ignores Zambia’s quick recovery and the more positive environment it now
faces. It also discounts social and political variables reacting to decreased growth and
rising prices that may not manifest themselves in economic indicators.
And last, this project has focused not only on the economic impact but the
structural vulnerabilities behind it, which the author believes are more critical for
recovery and sustainable development. With this perspective, it is clear that the failure to
address these weaknesses by both domestic and international actors will likely perpetuate
the same problems and cycles of underdevelopment in these countries. A better
understanding of these weaknesses is not simple, as many factors are also in play here.
As seen, economic processes after all do not happen in isolation, and underdevelopment
results from much more than financial and economic factors. Exploring and
understanding this then is critical in order to better equip LICs for future transmission
channels; to date, this seems to be the greatest lesson of the crisis.

95

REFERENCES
Adam, Christopher and Anthony M. Simpasa. "Harnessing Resource Revenes for
Prosperity in Zambia." Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford,
2009, 1-53.
Ahsan, Nazmul. "NPL situation improves in SCBs." The Financial Express. March 19,
2011. http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/more.php?date=2011-0319&news_id=129756 (accessed June 14, 2011).
Antonopoulos, Rania. “The Current Economic and Financial Crisis: A Gender
Perspective.” Working Paper No. 562, Bureau for Development Policy, Gender
Team, United Nations Development Program, May 2009.
Auboin, Marc. "The challenges of trade financing." VOX. January 28, 2009.
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2905 (accessed August 20, 2011).
Bangladesh Bank. "Chapter 5: Banking Sector Performance, Regulation and Bank
Supervision." 2009 Annual Report , 2009.
Bangladesh Export Promotion Bureau. Export Statistics Database. 2011.
http://www.epb.gov.bd/index.php?NoParameter&Theme=default&Script=detailse
xportdata (accessed 01 2011, May).
"Bangladesh inflation quickens on food price surges." Reuters. May 24, 2011.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/24/bangladesh-economy-inflationidUSL3E7GO0V320110524 (accessed July 20, 2011).
Bank of Zambia. "Annual Report 2009." 2009. http://www.boz.zm/AnnualReports.htm
(accessed March 20, 2011).
—. Monthly Bulletins Database. 2011. http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/media.php?id=7
(accessed February 20, 2011).
Barajas, Adolfo, Ralph Chami, Connel Fullenkamp, and Anjali Garg. "The Global
Financial Crisis and Workers' Remittances to Africa: What's the Damage?"
WP/10/24, International Monetary Fund, January 2010.
Berkmen, Pelen, Gaston Gelos, Robert Rennhack, and James P. Walsh. “The Global
Financial Crisis: Explaining Cross-Country Differences in the Output Impact.”
The International Monetary Fund, Working Paper, WP/09/280, 2009, 1-19.
Brinkman, Henk-Jan, et al. "High Food Prices and the Global Financial Crisis Have
Reduced Access to Nutritious Food and Worsened Nutritional Status and Health."
The Journal of Nutrition 140, no. 1 (January 2010): 154-161.
96

Burke, Jason and Saad Hammadi. "Dhaka garment workers in violent protests over low
pay." The Guardian Newspaper Online. July 30, 2010
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/30/dhaka-garment-workers-violentprotests (accessed May 20, 2011).
Chang, Ha-Joon and Ilene Grabel. Reclaiming Development: An Alternative Economic
Policy Manual. London & New York: Zed Books, 2004.
Charlton, Andrew and Joseph E. Stiglitz. "Trade Liberalization and the Costs of
Adjustment." Initiative for Policy Dialogue Working Paper Series, 2005: 170-214.
Choudhury, Toufic A. "Inclusive Financing: Access to Banking Services." Report for the
PKSF 20th Anniversary and Development Fair 2010, Bangladesh, 2010.
Chowdhury, Shamim. "The challenge before the RMG industry." The Financial Express.
March 28, 2009. http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/2009/03/28/62343.html
(accessed April 30, 2011).
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). "The Impact of the Financial Crisis on
Microfinance Institutions and Their Clients: Results from CGAP's 2009 Opinion
Survey." 2009.
Cook, Sarah and Wing Lam. "The Financial Crisis and China: What are the implications
for low income countries?" Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, England,
April 2009.
Cooper, Helene. "Economic Crisis Sidelines Fate of the World's Poorest." The New York
Times. November 11, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/world/11aid.html?_r=1&emc=eta1
(accessed December 2010, 15).
Dabla-Norris, Era, Jiro Honda, Amina Lahreche, and Geneviève Verdier. “FDI Flows to
Low-Income Countries: Global Drivers and Growth Implications.” IMF Working
Paper WP/10/132, The International Monetary Fund, June 2010.
Dang, Hai-Anh, Steve Knack, and Halsey Rogers. “International Aid and Financial
Crises in Donor Countries.” Policy Research Working Paper #5162, The World
Bank, December 2009.
Dodsworth, John R. "International Reserve Economies in Less Developed Countries."
Oxford Economic Papers 30, no. 2 (July 1978): 277-291.

97

Doughton, Sandi. "Gates Foundation scales bank 'grand' plan for global health." The
Seattle Times. November 9, 2010.
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2013381611_challenges09m.ht
ml (accessed December 15, 2010).
FinScope. "FinScope Zambia 2009: Top Line Findings." Final Report, 2009, 1-85.
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). FAO Food Price Index. 2011.
http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/foodpricesindex/en/ (accessed
March 2011, 22).
Frenkel, Jacob A. "The Demand for International Reserves by Developed and LessDeveloped Countries." Economica 41, no. 161 (February 1974): 14-24.
Grabel, Ilene. "The Political Economy of Remittances: What Do We Know? What do we
Need to Know?" Political Economic Research Institute Working Paper No. 184
(October 2008): 1-50.
Habib, Rakib Ibne. "Backward Linkages in Readymade Garment Industry of Bangladesh:
Appraisal and Policy Implications." Journal of Apparel and Textile, Technology
and Management (College of Textiles: NC University) 6, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 1-11.
Haider, Mohammed Ziau. "Competitiveness of the Bangladesh Ready-made Garment
Industry in Major International Markets." Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment
Review 3, no. 1 (June 2007): 3-27.
Hauner, David. "A Fiscal Price Tag for International Reserves." International Finance 9,
no. 2 (2006): 169–195.
Heritage Foundation. "2011 Index of Economic Freedom: Bangladesh." Heritage
Foundation. 2011. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/Bangladesh (accessed
July 23, 2011).
—. "2011 Index of Economic Freedom: Zambia." Heritage Foundation. 2011.
http://www.heritage.org/Index/Country/Zambia (accessed July 26, 2011).
Hermes, Niels and Robert Lensink. "Foreign Bank Presence, Domestic Bank
Performance, and Financial Development." Journal of Emerging Market Finance,
August 2004: 207-229.
Herrmann, Michael. "Food security and agricultural development in times of high
commodity prices." UNCTD Discussion Papers: No. 196, United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, November 2009.
98

Hirschman, Albert O. The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1958.
Humphrey, John. "Are Exporters in Africa Facing Reduced Availability of Trade
Finance." Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK, March 2009.
—. "Trade financing: Is it a barrier to Africa's exports?" VOX. April 28, 2009.
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3507 (accessed August 20 , 2011).
Iimi, Atsushi. "Escaping from the Resource Curse: Evidence from Botswana and the Rest
of the World." IMF Staff Papers (International Monetary Fund) 54, no. 4 (2007):
663-669.
"IMF to impose no condition on $1b loan to BD." The Financial Express. October 4,
2011. http://www.thefinancialexpress –
bd.com/more.php?news_id=151716&date=2011-10-04 (accessed October 7,
2011).
IndexMundi. Copper, grade A cathode Monthly Price - US Dollars per Metric Ton. 2011.
http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=copper&months=60
(accessed May 5, 2011).
"Indian banks discourage importing Bangladeshi goods." Weekly Blitz. September 12,
2011. http://www.weeklyblitz.net/1792/indian-banks-discourage-importingbangladeshi (accessed September 29, 2011).
International Monetary Fund. “Bangladesh: Selected Issues.” IMF Country Report No.
07/230, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, June 2007.
—. World Economic Outlook Database. September 2011.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx (accessed
August 20, 2011).
—. World Economic Outlook Database. October 2010.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/weodata/index.aspx (accessed
May 2011).
—. World Economic Outlook Database. April 2010.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/index.aspx (accessed
March 20, 2011).
—. "World Economic Outlook: Recovery, Risk, and Rebalancing." IMF Website.
October 2010. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/pdf/text.pdf
(accessed May 20, 2011).
99

—. "World Economic Outlook: Slowing Growth, Rising Risks." IMF Website. September
2011. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/pdf/text.pdf (accessed
September 24, 2011).
—. “Zambia and the IMF.” IMF Website. September 24, 2011.
http://www.imf.org/external/country/ZMB/index.htm (accessed September 24,
2011).
Kozul-Wright, Richard and Robert Rowthorn. "Spoilt for Choice? Multinational
Corporations and the Geography of International Production." Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, 1998: 74-92.
Lal, Deepak. The Poverty of Development Economics. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1985.
Lall, Sanjaya. "Exports of Manufactures by Developing Countries: Emerging Patterns of
Trade and Location." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 14, no. 2 (1998): 54-73.
—. "Technological Capabilities and Industrialization." World Development 20, no. 2
(1992): 165-186.
—. "The Technological Structure and Performance of Developing Country Manufactured
Exports, 1985-1998." Oxford Development Studies (International Development
Centre) 28, no. 3 (2000): 337-369.
Ley, Eduardo. “Exhaustible Resources and Fiscal Policy: Copper Mining in Zambia.”
Draft: Prepared for Public Expenditure Review, The World Bank, 2010.
Lustig, Nora. “Thought for Food: The Challenges of Coping with Soaring Food Prices.”
Working Paper Number 155, The Center For Global Development, Washington,
D.C., November 2008.
Meller, Patricio and Anthony M. Simpasa. "Role of Copper in the Chilean & Zambian
Economies: Main Economic and Policy Issues." Global Development Network
Working Paper Series #43, June 2011.
Mlachila, Montfort and Yongzheng Yang. "The End of Textiles Quotas: A Case Study of
the Impact on Bangladesh." IMF Working Paper WP/04/108, International
Monetary Fund, 2004.
Mujeri, Mustafa K. and Sayera Younus. "An Analysis of Interest Rate Spread in the
Banking Sector in Bangladesh." The Bangladesh Development Studies 32, no. 4
(December 2009): 1-33.
100

Murshid, Khan Ahmed Sayeed, Salma Chaudhuri Zohir, et al. The Global Financial
Crisis Implications for Bangladesh. BIDS-PRP Working Paper Series #1, The
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, April 2009.
Ndulo, Manenga, Dale Mudenda, Lutangu Ingombe and Frank Chansa. Paper 22: Phase
2 Zambia. Global Financial Discussion Series, London: Overseas Development
Institute, January 2010.
Ndulo, Manenga, Dale Mudenda, Lutangu Ingombe and Lillian Muchimba. Paper 10:
Zambia. Global Financial Discussion Series, London: Overseas Development
Institute, May 2009.
Nelson, R.R. and S.J. Winter. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982.
Nurkse, Ragnar. "Equilibrium and Growth in the World Economy." In Economic Essays
by Ragnar Nurkse, edited by Gottfried Haberler and Robert M. Stern, 241-281.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962.
—. Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1961.
NYSE.TV Website. Crude Oil Price History. 2011. http://www.nyse.tv/crude-oil-pricehistory.htm (accessed November 3, 2011).
Oanda. Historical Exchange Rates. 2011. http://www.oanda.com/currency/historicalrates/ (accessed July 20, 2011).
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). OECD.Stat
Extracts. 2011. http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx (accessed March 2011).
Prebisch, Raúl. "Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries." The American
Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-first Annual Meetings
of the American Economic Association) 49, no. 2 (May 1959): 251-273.
—. The Economic Development and Its Principal Problems. New York: United Nations,
1950.
Rahman, Mohammad Mustafizur. "The Foreign Trade of Bangladesh: Its Composition,
Performance, Trend, and Policy." School of Accounting, Economics and Finance,
The University of Southern Queensland, Queensland, Australia, 1-12.

101

Rahman, Mustafizur, Debapriya Bhattacharya, Md Ashiq Iqbal, Towfiqul Islam Khan
and Tapas Kumar Paul. Paper 1: Bangladesh. Global Financial Crisis Discussion
Series, London: Overseas Development Institute, May 2009.
Rahman, Mustafizur, Khondaker Golam Moazzem, and Syed Saifuddin Hossain. Impact
of the Global Economic Crisis on the Employment and Labour Market of
Bangladesh: A Preliminary Assessment. A Report Prepared by the Centre for
Policy Dialogue (CPD) in Collaboration with the International Labour
Organisation (ILO), Centre for Policy Dialogue, March 2009.
Rahman, Mustafizur, Md. Ashiq Iqbal, Towfiqul Islam Khan and Shouro Dasgupta.
Paper 12: Bangladesh Phase 2. Global Financial Crisis Discussion Series,
London: Overseas Development Institute, January 2010.
Ramstack, Tom. "Child labor common during economic recession, Labor Department
says." All Headline News. October 7, 2011.
http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/90062129?Child%20labor%20common
%20during%20economic%20recession%2C%20Labor%20Department%20says
(accessed October 8, 2011).
Ranis, Gustav. ""Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Asia's Superexporters:
Implications for Manufactured Exports from Latin America." The Quarterly
Review of Economics and Business, Summer 1981: 204-230.
—. "Another Look at the East Asian Miracle." The World Bank Economic Review 9, no.
3 (September 1995): 509-534.
Ricardo, David. On the Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation. New York:
General Books LLC, reprinted 2010.
Romer, Paul M. "The Origins of Endogenous Growth." Journal of Economic
Perspectives 8 (Winter): 3-22.
Rosenstein-Rodan, P. N. "Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe." The Economic Journal 53, no. 210/211 (Jun-Sep 1943): 202-211.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew M. Warner. Natural Resource Abundance and Economic
Growth. NBER Working Series, Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1995.
Salvatore, Dominick. International Economics. 8th Edition. Hoboken, New Jersey: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2004.

102

Samuelson, P.A. ""International Trade and the Equalization of Factor Prices". Economic
Journal (1948): 163-184.
Shah, Syed Ali-Mumtaz H. Bangladesh Financial Sector: An Agenda for Further
Reforms. Asian Development Bank, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2009.
Singer, Hans. "The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries."
American Economic Review 40 (May 1950): 473-485.
"Slowdown in garment sector avoidable – BGMEA." Fibre2Fashion: News. May 31,
2011.http://www.fibre2fashion.com/news/apparelnews/newsdetails.aspx?news_id
=99407 (accessed June 28, 2011).
Stiglitz, Joseph E. "Risk and Global Economic Architecture: Why Full Financial
Integration May Be Undesirable." American Economic Review: Papers &
Proceedings 100 (May 2010): 388-392.
Tiwari, Sailesh and Hassan Zaman. The Impact of Economic Shocks on Global
Undernourishment. Policy Research Working Paper #5215, The World Bank,
World Bank, 2010.
United Nations. "Building Inclusive Financial Sector for Development." 2006.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). UNCTADstat
Database. 2011.
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1584&lang=1 (accessed
July 2011).
—. Trade and Development Report. Geneva: United Nations, 2002.
World Bank. End of MFA Quotas: Key Issues and Strategic Options for Bangladesh
Readymade Garment Industry. Bangladesh Development Series-Paper No 2,
Dhaka: The World Bank: Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit,
December 2005.
—. Global Economic Prospects-January 2010. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2010.
—. "Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011." The World Bank. November 2010.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011-Ebook.pdf
(accessed March 20, 2011).

103

—. "The Extractive Industries Review (EIR): Regional Consultation Workshop for
Africa." The World Bank. 2003.
http://irispublic.worldbank.org/85257559006C22E9/All+Documents/8525755900
6C22E985256FF6006B0480/$File/volume4africaexecsummary.pdf (accessed
May 30, 2011).
—. The Global Economic Crisis: Assessing Vulnerability with a Poverty Lens.
Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009.
—. The Great Recession and Developing Countries: Economic Impact and Growth
Prospects. Edited by Mustapha K. Nabli. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank,
2011.
—. World dataBank: World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance.
2011. http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2
(accessed January 2011).
World Food Program. "The Market Monitor: Trends of staple food prices in vulnerable
countries." April 2011.
Zambian Central Statistics Office. "The Monthly." Central Statistics Office. August 2011.
http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/media/vol_101_2011_the_monthly_august.pdf
(accessed September 1, 2011).

104

APPENDIX A
Countries used to compute Figures 1 and 2; As of the April 2011 World Bank Income
Classifications: Low-income: $995 GNI per capita or less, Lower-middle income, $996 $3,965; Upper-middle income, $3,966 - $12,265; and High income: $12,266 or more.
Lower income
countries & territories:
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Central African
Republic
Chad
Comoros
Democratic Republic of
Congo
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Kenya
Korea
Kyrgyz Republic
Lao People's
Democratic Republic
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Niger
Rwanda
Sierra Leone

Solomon Islands
Tajikistan
Tanzania
The Gambia
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Excluded
(data problems)
Liberia (only in 1.2
excluded)
Somalia
Zimbabwe
Lower-middle income
countries & territories:
Angola
Armenia
Belize
Bhutan
Bolivia
Cameroon
Cape Verde
China
Republic of Congo
Côte d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Georgia
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
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India
Indonesia
Iraq
Jordan
Kiribati
Kosovo
Latvia
Lesotho
Maldives
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay

Philippines
Samoa
São Tomé and Príncipe
Senegal
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Swaziland
Syrian Arab Republic
Thailand
Democratic Republic of
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tunisia
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu

Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Republic of Yemen
Excluded
(data problems)
Iraq
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.
Tuvalu
West Bank and Gaza
Upper-middle income
countries & territories:
Albania
Algeria
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Gabon
Grenada
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Jamaica
Kazakhstan
Lebanon
Libya* (2006-2010
years)
Lithuania
Macedonia, FYR
Malaysia
Mauritius
Mexico

Montenegro
Namibia
Panama
Peru
Romania
Russian Federation
Serbia
Seychelles
South Africa
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
Suriname
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela, RB
Excluded
(data problems)
Palau
American Samoa
Mayotte
Cuba
Fiji
Sint Maarten
St. Martin
Curaçao
Libya* (2011 and 2012
years)
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